Asperger’s Syndrome and Eligibility under the IDEA: Eliminating the Emerging  Failure First  Requirement to Prevent a Good IDEA from Going Bad by Lukasik, Lisa
Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2012
Asperger’s Syndrome and Eligibility under the
IDEA: Eliminating the Emerging "Failure First"
Requirement to Prevent a Good IDEA from Going
Bad
Lisa Lukasik
Campbell University School of Law, lukasikl@campbell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Lisa Lukasik, Asperger’s Syndrome and Eligibility under the IDEA: Eliminating the Emerging "Failure First" Requirement to Prevent a Good
IDEA from Going Bad, 19 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 252 (2012).
ASPERGER’S SYNDROME AND ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE IDEA: 
ELIMINATING THE EMERGING “FAILURE FIRST” 
REQUIREMENT TO PREVENT A GOOD IDEA FROM 
GOING BAD∗ 
Lisa Lukasik∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Establishing a child’s eligibility for services and protections under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires “a difficult 
and sensitive analysis.” This is particularly true when a child’s family 
and her school agree that she has a disability that could qualify her for 
special educational benefits under the Act, but disagree about whether 
that disability in fact renders her eligible for those benefits. Such 
disagreements highlight a gap in the federal law that several circuit 
courts of appeal recently filled with a requirement that children with 
disabilities who also receive passing grades in school, like many 
children with Asperger’s Syndrome, “fail first” academically before they 
may qualify as “a child with a disability” eligible for services and 
protections under the Act.  
This Article is among the first to consider the Asperger’s Syndrome 
example in the context of these decisions. It argues that recent restrictive 
constructions of regulatory definitions of IDEA-eligible disabling 
conditions frustrate the purpose of the IDEA, create an unnecessary 
constitutional vulnerability in the Act, and fly in the face of public policy 
supporting preparation of “all children with disabilities” not only to get 
good grades in school, but also for “employment[] and independent 
living” as productive citizens in their communities. It also proposes a 
more inclusive understanding of the phrase “child with a disability” 
under the IDEA to better serve the statute’s expressed educational and 
societal goals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Establishing a child’s eligibility for services and protections under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires “a ‘difficult and 
sensitive’ analysis.”1 This is particularly true when a child’s family and 
his school agree that he has a disability that could qualify him for special 
education under the Act, but disagree about whether that disability in fact 
renders him eligible for it.2  
                                                     
1
 Mr. I ex rel. L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 162 (1st Cir. 2004)).  
2
 Parents and school systems may disagree about whether a child with a 
recognized disability qualifies for special education under the IDEA for either of 
two reasons: (1) because they disagree about whether that disability adversely 
affects educational performance under the regulatory definitions of all but one 
of the qualifying disabilities or (2) because they disagree about whether the 
child with a recognized disability needs special education services under the 
statute. This Article addresses the first of these two reasons. See, e.g., C.B. v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 322 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “[n]either 
party contests that [the child’s] ADHD and bipolar disorder could qualify as 
disabling conditions” under the IDEA but also that the parties disagree about 
whether these disorders qualify as “disabling conditions” in this child who 
254 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 19:2 
Consider “A.J.’s” case.3 When A.J. entered preschool, his teachers 
recognized “significant delays in A.J.’s fine motor and social emotional 
functioning.”4 They informed A.J.’s parents of their son’s apparent 
developmental deficits and sought consent to conduct a special education 
evaluation.5 A.J.’s parents gave their consent.  
After A.J.’s school-based evaluation was complete, the district’s 
Committee of Preschool Special Education informed A.J.’s parents that 
their son should be classified “as a preschool student with a disability.”6 
                                                                                                                      
received passing grades and tested “above grade-level” in school); Alvin Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. A.D., 503 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “there is 
no dispute that [the child’s] ADHD is considered an ‘other health impairment,’ a 
recognized qualifying disability,” but also recognizing that the school district 
contends that the child does not qualify as disabled for purposes of special 
education services “because his educational performance is adequate without 
them”); Mr. I, 480 F.3d at 4 (recognizing that all “parties agree that [the child] 
suffers from Asperger’s, manifested in her poor pragmatic language skills and 
social understanding difficulties, as well as from a depressive disorder brought 
on by the stress of managing these problems,” but that “[t]he parties disagree, 
however, on whether these conditions have adversely affected [the child’s] 
educational performance in light of her strong grades”); Maus v. Wappingers 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (recognizing that 
“[t]he School District does not contest that one or more of [the child’s] disorders 
[which included Asperger’s Syndrome] could qualify as a disabling condition 
under IDEA” and also that the district disagreed that the disorders in fact 
qualified the child because the child excelled academically, refuting, in the 
district’s view, “proof that [his] condition has adversely affected his . . . 
academic performance”); A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 
679 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (recognizing that “[w]hether or 
not [the child] has Asperger’s, which is on the Autism spectrum, is not seriously 
in dispute” because there is “no evidence suggesting that [the child] does not 
have Asperger’s” but also concluding that the parties disagree about whether the 
child with Asperger’s Syndrome has a “disabling condition” for purposes of 
eligibility under the IDEA because, despite behavioral and emotional 
disruptions at school, he was “fine” academically). 
3
 The facts of A.J.’s case as depicted in this introduction are taken largely from 
those in A.J. v. Board of Education, East Islip Union Free School District, 679 
F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (considering the IDEA eligibility of a child 
with Asperger’s Syndrome). 
4
 A.J., 679 F. Supp. 2d at 302. 
5
 See id. at 302; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(1) (2011) (establishing the 
regulatory obligation to “obtain informed consent . . . from the parent of the 
child before conducting the evaluation” to determine the child’s eligibility for 
special education services under the IDEA). 
6
 Id. Children with autism spectrum disorders, including Asperger’s Syndrome 
which is the focus of this Article, may require diagnosis by developmental 
pediatricians or psychiatrists and services of special education teachers/aides, 
speech therapists, behavioral therapists, occupational therapists, physical 
therapists, counselors, and psychologists. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
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Although concerned that this disability designation could “stick” with 
their son and stigmatize him to a lifetime of limitations,7 A.J.’s parents 
accepted the school district’s “preschool student with a disability” label 
to secure critical early-intervention, in-school assistance recommended 
by those who evaluated A.J.8 With these accommodations in place, A.J. 
functioned appropriately in the mainstreamed preschool environment by 
the time he approached kindergarten age.9  
As soon as he accomplished this milestone, however, the 
accommodations upon which he relied to reach it were taken away. The 
committee that originally designated A.J. as a “preschool child with a 
disability” now determined that A.J. was “not [] eligible to receive 
preschool special education services for the [coming] school year” in 
part “due to teacher reports of steady progress.”10  
Without accommodations for his disabilities, A.J. “beg[a]n to ‘fall 
apart’ as a regular education student.”11 At the first parent-teacher 
conference following the removal of special educational services, A.J.’s 
“teachers reported[] . . . that A.J. was ‘fine’ academically, but that his 
behavior was ‘disruptive, compulsive, and all-consuming.’” 
While the published decision in A.J.’s case did not offer examples of 
his “disruptive, compulsive, and all-consuming” behavior, A.J.’s teachers 
likely observed common symptoms of A.J.’s disability: an “immature . . . 
[in]ability to manage emotions”; unique “attention problems” requiring 
regular redirection; an “unusual learning style” demanding hands-on 
                                                                                                                      
OFFICE, GAO-05-220, SPECIAL EDUCATION: CHILDREN WITH AUTISM 22 (2005), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05220.pdf. 
7
 See ELLEN NOTBOHM, TEN THINGS EVERY CHILD WITH AUTISM WISHES YOU 
KNEW 1 (2005) (recognizing that those “who live with . . . autism also live with 
the frustrating lack of knowledge and unfair stereotypes assigned by the larger 
world. Whether we like it or not, ‘autistic’ does not yet inspire general reactions 
of a favorable nature, does not yet stir the casual bystander to look beyond the 
label to see a whole person, splendidly full of both gifts and gaffs. The broader 
reaction, ‘Uh-oh. Silent, withdrawn head-banger,’ is still too common; the first 
assumption is one of limitations”).  
8
 See Sheryl Dicker & Emily Bennett, Engulfed by the Spectrum: The Impact of 
Autism Spectrum Disorders on Law and Policy, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 415, 438 
(2011) (stating that “[e]arly identification of ASDs [autism spectrum disorders] 
is critical to the most effective management of ASDs and optimal outcomes for 
children” and recognizing that “[t]he American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”) 
recently issued a report recommending that all pediatricians screen every child 
in their care for signs of ASD at 9, 18, and either 24 or 36 months”). 
9
 A.J., 679 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (noting that as accommodations for his still-
unspecified disability, A.J. received occupational therapy in a sensory-integrated 
gym at school and special educational services in his preschool classroom). 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
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attention; “problems with motor coordination” resulting in 
indecipherable handwriting; an inability to “notice or understand the 
non-verbal signals” that convey messages in the classroom; and 
persistent “interrupting and not responding” in a manner inappropriate in 
the social context in a classroom.12 A.J. also may have exhibited 
meltdowns during unexpected in-school transitions or in busy sensory-
simulating environments13 and he may have engaged in unexplained 
repetitive, whole-body movements that were disruptive to others in the 
classroom.14 
Given “concerns regarding his socialization behaviors,” A.J.’s 
parents requested that A.J. be reconsidered for special educational 
services.15 The classroom teacher and the school psychologist agreed to 
refer A.J. for reevaluation.16 The school district’s special education 
teacher observed A.J. in class.17 She concluded that A.J. “exhibited 
inappropriate behaviors [in a regular education classroom] and required 
frequent redirection.”18 She also emphasized that A.J.’s “interactions 
with his peers were often inappropriate.”19 On the other hand, A.J. 
demonstrated “above[-]average skills” in language development 
according to the school’s speech therapist and “average verbal and 
nonverbal abilities” according to the school psychologist.20 
Outside school, A.J.’s parents sought input from three specialized 
medical providers.21 Each of these doctors independently diagnosed A.J. 
with Asperger’s Syndrome on the autism spectrum.22 A.J.’s occupational 
therapist indicated in support of the Asperger’s Syndrome diagnosis that 
                                                     
12
 See TONY ATTWOOD, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO ASPERGER’S SYNDROME 15 
(2007) (describing ways in which “experienced teachers” might recognize 
Asperger’s Syndrome in their students in the “early school years”).  
13
 See NOTBOHM, supra note 7, at 8 (recognizing that in autistic children, 
“[s]eemingly inexplicable behavior such as aggression, excessive silliness, 
clumsiness, over- or under-reaction to injury . . . tantrums and meltdowns” may 
all be explained through “sensory overload”); ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 271 
(stating that “one of the attributes of Asperger’s Syndrome . . . is hyper- and 
hyposensitivity to specific sensory experiences”). 
14
 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION 74–77 (4th ed. 1994) 
[hereinafter DSM-IV].  
15
 A.J., 679 F. Supp. 2d at 302.  
16
 Id. 
17
 Id.  
18
 Id.  
19
 Id.  
20
 Id. at 302–03. 
21
 Id. at 302. 
22
 Id. at 302, 306 (noting that in addition to Asperger’s Syndrome, A.J.’s doctors 
also diagnosed him with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and stating that 
the school district agreed with the Asperger’s Syndrome diagnosis). 
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“A.J. had ‘serious social issues that need consistent intervention.’”23 
Additionally, A.J.’s behavioral doctor affirmed that A.J. “[would] require 
services when he enter[ed] school . . . most significantly services that 
[would] support development of pragmatic social skills.”24  
After all the evaluations and observations were completed, the 
school district agreed with A.J.’s parents and the medical practitioners 
that had evaluated A.J.: A.J. was a child with Asperger’s Syndrome on 
the autism spectrum.25 Additionally, the school district agreed with A.J.’s 
parents that A.J.’s disability manifested itself at school in bothersome 
ways. The school district agreed that A.J. demonstrated inappropriate 
social interaction and exhibited inappropriate school behavior that drew 
attention and rebuke in class.26 The school district disagreed, however, 
that A.J.’s disability rendered him a “child with a disability” for purposes 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).27 The school 
district concluded that although A.J.’s school behavior and social 
interactions were inappropriate, he was “fine” academically, and thus did 
not qualify for special education.28  
Situations in which parents disagree with their child’s public 
educators about eligibility for special education under circumstances like 
A.J.’s present particularly challenging cases.29 In many such cases, this 
disagreement highlights a gap in the federal law that leaves children with 
disabilities who receive passing grades in school, like many children 
with Asperger’s Syndrome,30 dependent upon jurisdiction-specific 
                                                     
23
 Id. at 302. 
24
 Id.  
25
 Id. at 306. 
26
 Id. at 302. 
27
 Id.  
28
 Id. Ultimately, the court agreed with the school district that because A.J. was 
progressing academically, he did not qualify for and was not eligible for special 
education or related services. Id. 
29
 See, e.g., Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D., 616 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 
2010) (stating directly that “[t]his is a complicated case” when all parties agreed 
that the child at issue had a disability, Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, but disagreed 
about whether that disability required special educational services under the 
IDEA); Mr. I ex rel. L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
2007) (stating that a “difficult and sensitive analysis” is required when all 
parties agree that a child has Asperger’s Syndrome but disagree about whether 
the child is eligible for special education to support social and behavioral 
challenges (quoting Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 162 (1st Cir. 
2004))).  
30
 See ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 232 (noting that children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome “may have an IQ that suggests intellectual potential to achieve good 
grades in school work”); JAMES T. WEBB ET AL., MISDIAGNOSIS AND DUAL 
DIAGNOSES OF GIFTED CHILDREN AND ADULTS 94 (2005) (stating that in 
contrast with other autism spectrum disorders in which children “show major 
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interpretations of the IDEA to determine whether they are eligible in 
their state for the services and protections offered by the Act.31  
Through its consideration of the Asperger’s Syndrome example, this 
Article demonstrates that narrow constructions of the IDEA’s definitions 
of disabling conditions to exclude children like A.J., who experience 
significant challenges at school without receiving failing grades in 
school, frustrate the purpose of the IDEA, create an unnecessary 
constitutional vulnerability in the Act, and fly in the face of public policy 
in support of ensuring that “all children with disabilities” are prepared 
not only to get good grades, but also for “employment[] and independent 
living” as productive citizens in their communities.32  
This Article presents its principal thesis in three parts. Part I offers 
an overview of the relevant portions of the IDEA and examines the 
development of divergent interpretations of the phrase “adversely affects 
. . . educational performance” in the regulations defining the statutorily-
enumerated disabling conditions. It also demonstrates the gap in 
scholarship on Asperger’s Syndrome and eligibility and offers a brief 
overview of the disabling characteristics of autism spectrum disorders 
with a focus on Asperger’s Syndrome.33 Part II demonstrates, through the 
Asperger’s Syndrome example, that a narrow construction of “adversely 
affects . . . educational performance” is inconsistent with the IDEA’s 
expressed objectives and educational mandates.34 Part III examines the 
constitutional vulnerability created by courts’ reliance upon state law to 
limit access to the IDEA’s services and protections.35  
                                                                                                                      
handicaps in intellect and in their ability to think and learn, people with 
Asperger’s Disorder typically do not have such problems” and that “they may 
score quite highly on intelligence or achievement tests”); Christy Marlette, The 
Effects of the IDEA Reauthorization of 2004 and the No Child Left Behind Act 
on Families with Autistic Children: Allocation of Burden of Proof, Recovery of 
Witness Fees, and Attainment of Proven Educational Methods for Autism, 18 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 58 (2008) (stating that children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome “may receive good grades” but still have considerable difficulty with 
other aspects of education). 
31
 Compare J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 66–68 (2d Cir. 
2000) (applying Vermont’s regulatory law to hold that a child with emotional 
and behavioral disabilities was not eligible for special education services under 
the IDEA because the child received passing grades) with Mr. I, 480 F.3d at 11–
13 (applying Maine’s regulatory law to hold that a child with emotional and 
behavioral disabilities associated with Asperger’s Syndrome was eligible for 
special education services under the IDEA even though the child had “excelled 
academically”).  
32
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
33
 See infra notes 132-69 and accompanying text. 
34
 See infra notes 185-284 and accompanying text. 
35
 See infra notes 285-330 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, this Article concludes that the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, the Constitution, and public policy all embrace an open-
door approach to disability designation and eligibility under the IDEA. 
Children with Asperger’s Syndrome, and others with disabilities and 
passing grades, ought to receive a more hospitable welcome within the 
Act when they seek its shelter. To ensure this future, either Congress or 
the courts must clarify that neither the IDEA nor the Department of 
Education regulations implementing the IDEA permit schools to require 
children with disabilities to “fail first.” Instead, schools comply with the 
IDEA and fulfill its purpose on behalf of all children only when the 
IDEA’s definition of “child with a disability” is given its plain – 
inclusive – meaning.  
II. PUTTING THE PIECES OF THIS PUZZLE TOGETHER: REVIEWING THE 
IDEA, KEY COMPONENTS OF THE DEFINITIONS OF DISABLING 
CONDITIONS, AND ASPERGER’S SYNDROME 
A. BACKGROUND ON THE IDEA AND ELIGIBILITY 
For over three decades, it has been clear that “[i]mproving 
educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of 
our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity. . . .”36 Congress 
established this national priority in 1975 when it passed the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act (now renamed the Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act or IDEA).37 This landmark legislation 
became the first federal legislation guaranteeing the nation’s public 
schools would be open to and accommodating of children with 
disabilities,38 and it signaled the beginning of the end of the historic 
                                                     
36
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006).  
37
 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 (2006 & 
Supp. 2011)). 
38
 Prior to 1975 families of children with disabilities had little access to public 
education for their children. State laws “either permitted or explicitly required 
the exclusion of the ‘weak minded’ or physically disabled.” MARK C. WEBER ET 
AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (3d ed. 2010); see also 
Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: 
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 
355–56 (1990) (summarizing legislative, administrative, and judicial activity 
from the late 1800s through the 1960s that either required or permitted the 
exclusion of children with disabilities from public schools). Some states even 
punished parents criminally if they tried to insist upon public education for their 
child previously deemed excluded by the superintendent. See, e.g., Act of May 
18, 1965, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 643–44. 
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segregation of these children from and within America’s public 
schools.39  
Congress has re-visited and re-enforced the terms of this 
breakthrough legislation multiple times in the nearly four decades since 
the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.40 Each 
time, it has affirmed the importance of the Act’s fundamental goal of 
improving educational results for children with disabilities. Although 
Congress has expressed appropriate concern about improper over-
diagnosis of children with disabilities,41 it has never resolved those 
concerns through eligibility restrictions excluding from the Act children 
with disabilities affecting school performance. Instead, Congress 
addressed concerns about over-diagnosis through amendments targeted 
at eliminating monetary incentives to classify children with a 
diagnosis,42 opening the door to eligibility for some children exhibiting 
                                                     
39
 Two early cases, Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 
343 F. Supp. 279, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (resolving a claim based upon 
“exclusions of retarded children . . . based upon four State statutes . . . 
reliev[ing] the State Board of Education from any obligation to educate a child 
whom a public school psychologist certifies as uneducable and untrainable[, 
and] allow[ing] indefinite postponement of admission to public school of any 
child who has not attained a mental age of five years”) and Mills v. Board of 
Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972) (resolving a claim based upon 
students’ challenge to their “exclu[sion] . . . from the District of Columbia 
Public Schools and/or den[ial] . . . [of] publically supported education”), 
effectively describe the state of educational access for children with disabilities 
prior to 1975, and they demonstrate how advocates for these children began to 
build on the momentum established by African American children in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), in seeking equal access to 
schools.  
40
 See, e.g., Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity 
Under the IDEA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1162 (2007) (“The legislative history 
of the term ‘child with a disability’ largely reflects an expansion of coverage 
over the last thirty years . . . .”). 
41
 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 26–27 (1975), reprinted in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1450 (acknowledging at the time of the initial passage of 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act that members of the Senate 
Labor and Public Welfare Committee were “deeply concerned . . . about the 
practices and procedures which result in classifying children as having 
handicapping conditions when, in fact, they do not have such conditions”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 108-77, at 84 (2003) (expressing at the time of the most recent 
reauthorization of the IDEA a continuing concern that the over-identification of 
children “takes valuable resources away from students who are truly disabled”). 
42
 See H.R. REP. NO 104-614, at 9 (1996); S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 8–9 (1997); 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17, § 611(e), 111 Stat. 37, 49 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 
1411(a)(2)(B)(iii)(I)-(II) (2006). 
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developmental delays without any diagnosis at all,43 and requiring 
reports specifically addressing issues of over-identification for study by 
the United States Secretary of Education.44  
At the same time, Congress has improved the Act’s ability to 
accomplish its optimistic goal through amendments expanding the 
legislation’s reach in 1986,45 in 1990 (when the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) and when Congress added autism as a specific 
category of eligibility),46 in 1991,47 in 1997,48 and in 2004.49 Today, 
Congress continues to support the IDEA and its goal of ensuring equal, 
publically-supported educational opportunities for all – including 
children with disabilities – as it debates the IDEA Fairness Restoration 
Act of 2011.50  
                                                     
43
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2006) (including as a “child with a disability” 
within the protection of the Act children aged three through nine who are 
“experiencing developmental delays” even though those children are not 
diagnosed with a disability specified under 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2006 & 
Supp. 2011)). 
44
 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(24) (2006), 1416(a)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. 2011) 
(requiring states to have “policies and procedures designed to prevent the 
inappropriate overidentification or disproportionate representation by race and 
ethnicity of children as children with disabilities” and requiring the Secretary of 
Education to prioritize monitoring the states to ensure that “[d]isproportionate 
representation of racial and ethnic groups in special education” is not “the result 
of inappropriate identification”).  
45
 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 
100 Stat. 1145 (1986). 
46
 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). 
47
 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendment of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-119, 105 Stat. 587 (1991). 
48
 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 
(2006 & Supp. 2011)). 
49
 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 (2006 
& Supp. 2011)). Some refer to this legislation as IDEIA or the 2004 
Reauthorization. For purposes of this Article, it will be referred to as the IDEA, 
the acronym established for this legislation in 1990 with the passage of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1990.  
50
 IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, S. 613, 112th Congress (2011), available at 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-s613/show; IDEA Fairness Restoration 
Act, H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.opencongress.org/ 
bill/112-h1208/show. This legislation was initially introduced in 2007. See 
IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 4188, 110th Cong. (2007). It was later 
reintroduced in 2009 and 2011. See IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 2740, 
111th Congress (2009); IDEA Fairness Restoration Act S. 613, 112th Congress 
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To implement the legislative imperative to improve educational 
results for children with disabilities, the IDEA affords such children “a 
free appropriate public education . . . designed to meet their unique 
needs and prepare them” for their futures, including futures in “further 
education, employment, and independent living.”51 From the perspective 
of parents of children with disabilities, this legislative mandate offers 
promise. However, after nearly four decades of continued progress 
toward improving educational opportunities for children with 
disabilities, some now say this legislative entitlement in favor of children 
with disabilities offers too much promise.  
Recently, popular commentators have begun to wring their hands 
over a concern that the IDEA has become too much, both in terms of 
numbers of qualifying individuals and in terms of cost.52 These critics of 
the IDEA’s growth suggest that Congress has opened “the door to special 
education services . . . too widely and too indiscriminately, placing at 
risk the ability of school districts to respond to the needs of students in 
general education.”53 
                                                                                                                      
(2011), IDEA Fairness Restoration Act H.R. 1208, 112th Congress (2011). In 
2011, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce on March 
17, 2011, and the House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and 
Secondary Education. Once passed, this legislation would update the IDEA to 
authorize the recovery of expert’s fees along with attorney’s fees for prevailing 
parties in litigation over the provision of special educational services under the 
IDEA. See IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011); IDEA 
Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (2011); cf. Arlington Cent. 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (declining to extend the 
IDEA’s existing terms to authorize an award of expert witness fees in addition to 
attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties in special education litigation).  
51
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006).  
52
 See, e.g., Robert Worth, The Scandal of Special-Ed, WASH. MONTHLY, June 
1999, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/1999/9906. 
worth.scandal.html (stating that “the real scandal is not simply that we spend 
too much to educate handicapped kids” but also that “the special education law 
has inflated the meaning of ‘disability,’ encouraging wealthier families to 
capitalize on their weaknesses at the expense of their peers” such that in the 
author’s estimation “[m]ore than 80 percent of all school children in the United 
States could qualify as learning-disabled under one definition or another”). 
While there are a number of reasons that schools, families of children with 
disabilities, and taxpayers criticize the IDEA and its implementation, this Article 
focuses on those criticisms associated with the increasing number of children 
included under the IDEA umbrella. 
53
 See Hensel, supra note 40, at 1149 (citing as examples of commentators 
expressing this concern, Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Time to Make 
Education “Special” Again, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 23, 26 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al., eds. 2001) and Gregory F. Corbett, 
Special Education, Equal Protection and Education Finance: Does the 
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There is no dispute that the number of children diagnosed with 
disabilities has increased significantly following passage of the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975. During the 1976-
1977 school year, on the heels of the Act’s passage, public schools 
provided 3,694,000 children,54 or 8.3% of the total enrollment in the 
nation’s public elementary and secondary schools,55 with special 
educational services. Thirty years later, during the 2007-2008 school 
year, public schools served 6,606,000 children, or 13.4% of the total 
enrollment in the nation’s public elementary and secondary schools, 
under the IDEA.56  
Similarly, there is no dispute that federal spending on special 
education has increased, and the services provided under the IDEA have 
grown to become “the second largest federal K-12 program.”57 In fiscal 
year 2006, the federal budget provided a total of $37.6 billion for 
primary and secondary education.58 Of this amount, $11.1 billion, or 
nearly thirty percent of the total national expenditure for primary and 
secondary education, was provided directly to state and local 
governments to implement the IDEA.59  
                                                                                                                      
Individuals with Disabilities Act Violate a General Education Student’s Right to 
Education?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 633, 634 (1999)). 
54
 THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2010-013, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, 
2009, at 84 tbl.50 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010013_2a.pdf.  
55
 Id.  
56
 Id. While this represents an increase of just over five percent of the total 
student population over thirty years, it is worth noting that “[t]he overall 
percentage of students being served in programs for those with disabilities 
remained relatively stable from 2002-03 (13.5 percent) and 2007-08 (13.4 
percent).” Id. at 55. 
57
 U.S. Department of Education, 10 Facts about K-12 Education Funding 
(2005), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/10facts.pdf. 
58
 Id. at 4. Total taxpayer spending on primary and secondary education in the 
2004–05 school year was $536 billion, even though the federal government 
provided only 8.3 percent of that sum. Id. at 2. This is because public education 
is primarily the responsibility of state and local government, which provide the 
overwhelming majority – 45.6 percent and 37.1 percent respectively in the 
2004–05 school year – of funding for public schools. Id. Private sources also 
provide some funding for primary and secondary education, but this 
contribution is primarily for private schools. Id.  
59
 Id. at 4. Notably, however, the IDEA remains under-funded today. See Glen 
Chang, Note, Caring for New Jersey’s Children with Autism: A Multifaceted 
Struggle for Parity, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 997, 999 (2008) (recognizing that 
although the IDEA authorizes the federal appropriations for up to 40% of the 
Act’s costs, federal funds have thus far covered no more than 17–18% at the 
most, leaving state and local governments to foot the bill for the legislation); see 
also Antonis Katsiyannis et al., Reflections on the 25th Anniversary of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 22 REMEDIAL AND SPECIAL EDUC. 
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With this statistical reality, concerns that the IDEA may now reach 
too far – to too many children and to too many public dollars – cannot be 
ignored. The stated reasons for the concern about the IDEA’s growth 
vary widely.60 Significant for purposes of this Article are accusations that 
“highly educated and affluent parents are fueling the rise in numbers by 
aggressively seeking eligibility for modestly impaired children as a way 
to secure from districts expensive services that are not otherwise 
available to children in the general school population.”61 Or, put another 
way, the IDEA (despite Congress’s best efforts) now creates an incentive 
to stretch diagnoses to include individuals with mild or disputed 
symptoms such that children qualify for an “array of often expensive 
services and accommodations” offered at the expense of children 
without disabilities in the general education population.62  
                                                                                                                      
324, 329 (2001) (recognizing that although Congress established a goal of 
paying 40% of the costs incurred in educating students with disabilities, “[t]he 
actual levels of funding to the states . . . have usually amounted to 
approximately 8% to 10% of states’ total expenditures on special education”). 
60
 Some are concerned about financial inequity. Some are concerned about the 
adverse impact of improper diagnoses. Another significant criticism beyond the 
scope of this Article is that the IDEA’s rapid expansion is responsible for the 
disproportionate numbers of minority children identified as eligible for special 
educational services under the IDEA’s “mentally retarded” and “emotionally 
disturbed” eligibility categories. Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2009). Disproportionate identification of minority 
children as children with disabilities means that some of these children were 
improperly identified. Their “misplacement into special education [may] 
stigmatize[] students, den[y] them a high quality education, limit[] their future 
opportunities, and take[] valuable resources away from truly disabled students.” 
Robert R. Garda, Who Is Eligible under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Improvement Act?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 293 (2006). Because 
Congress recognized the significance of this concern about mis-diagnosis of 
minority children as eligible for special education services, it made resolving 
this mis-diagnosis concern one of the focuses of the 2004 amendments to the 
IDEA and its resolution remains the focus of educators at local and national 
levels today. The IDEA now requires public schools to implement “policies and 
procedures designed to prevent the inappropriate overidentification or 
disproportionate representation by race and ethnicity of children as children 
with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(24)(C) (2006). Additionally, the IDEA 
requires the United States Secretary of Education to make it “a priority” to 
monitor the identification of racial minorities as children with disabilities to 
avoid inappropriate identifications. Id. § 1416(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2011). A 
comprehensive examination of the effectiveness of these measures is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
61
 Hensel, supra note 40, at 1150. But see CHILDREN WITH AUTISM: A PARENT’S 
GUIDE 47 (Michael D. Powers ed., 2d ed. 2000) (making clear that no parent 
would seek a diagnosis for their child absent necessity because “[v]ery few 
things indeed are worse than learning that your child has autism”).  
62
 Horn & Tynan, supra note 53, at 30. 
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In reality, government statistics belie such concerns in three ways. 
First, data suggests that the number of students with disabilities in public 
schools has now leveled off. Despite initial growth in provision of 
special educational services after they were first required in 1975,63 
growth has not been unlimited. According to the United States 
Department of Education, “[t]he overall percentage of students being 
served in programs for those with disabilities remained relatively stable 
between 2002–2003 (13.5 percent) and 2007–2008 (13.4 percent).”64 In 
fact, overall provision of special education service was down one tenth 
of a percent in 2007-2008 compared to the prior year.65 This suggests, 
generally speaking, that over the last five years the feared increase in 
questionably-diagnosed children receiving special educational 
programming has not materialized.  
Second, although there were some “patterns of change in the 
percentages served with some specific conditions between 2002–[20]03 
and 2007–[20]08,”66 including in the autism category, even these 
numbers have begun to level off over the most recent three years of 
data.67 From 2004-2005 to 2007-2008, “the percentage [of children 
eligible for services under the IDEA after a diagnosis] with autism rose 
from 0.3 to 0.6 percent.”68 This fact is not surprising, of course, given 
                                                     
63
 SNYDER & DILLOW, supra note 54, at 84 tbl.50.  
64
 Id.  
65
 Id. at 84. 
66
 Id. at 55.  
67
 It merits mentioning here that proposed changes to the diagnostic criteria for 
autism spectrum disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders has raised questions about whether the numbers of individuals 
diagnosed in this eligibility category will decrease significantly going forward. 
See, e.g., Benedict Cary, New Definition of Autism will Exclude Many, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/health/ 
research/new-autism-definition-would-exclude-many-studysuggests.html?_r=2 
&hp=&pagewanted=print. On the other hand, others suggest that numbers of 
eligible children with autism should continue to grow because evidence 
suggests that “racial and ethnic minorities, women and girls, adults and 
individuals from rural and low-income communities” remain under-diagnosed 
in this category “even where they clearly fit criteria under the DSM-IV.” Autism 
Society & ASAN, The Joint Statement of the Autism Society and Autistic Self 
Advocacy Network on the DSM-5 and Autism, AUTISM SOCIETY (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.autism-society.org/news/in-the-news/the-joint-statement-of-
the.html; see also infra 134–40 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed 
changes to the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorders and their impact 
on the analysis in this Article).  
68
 Id. Some children with Asperger’s Syndrome are designated as “other health 
impaired,” a category of eligibility that is also on the rise:  
 
The percentage of children identified as having other health 
impairments (limited strength, vitality, or alertness due to 
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that autism and Asperger’s Syndrome are relative newcomers to the 
IDEA eligibility discussion.69 The Act became law in 1975, but autism 
was not added as a qualifying disability under the IDEA until 1990,70 and 
Asperger’s Syndrome was introduced to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders as a discrete diagnosis within the autism 
spectrum for the first time four years later in 1994.71 As diagnosticians 
and educators have been introduced to autism and Asperger’s Syndrome 
in recent years, diagnosis of each has increased as familiarity with these 
disabilities has increased. The same pattern of growth and leveling off 
has proven true with other diagnoses and eligibility categories 
introduced into the IDEA through amendments after passage of the 
original legislation.72 In any event, government data also suggests that 
the percentage of children served under the autism eligibility category 
may have leveled off at approximately one-half-of-one percent of the 
total public school population in the most recent three years of data 
collection.73 Thus, although the numbers of children diagnosed under the 
autism eligibility category grew during the first decade after the category 
                                                                                                                      
chronic or acute health problems such as a heart condition, 
tuberculosis, rheumatic fever, nephritis, asthma, sickle cell 
anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead poisoning, leukemia, or 
diabetes) rose from 0.8 to 1.3 percent of total public school 
enrollment.  
 
Id.  
69
 It has been common for IDEA’s eligibility categories to experience growth 
following the addition of new diagnoses or categories of children within them. 
For example, in the two IDEA-eligibility categories experiencing growth, “other 
health impaired” and “developmental delays,” there have been new diagnoses or 
categories of children recently recognized within each. Under the “other health 
impairment” category in which data shows the most growth in recent years, 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder was newly-included in the regulations 
interpreting the IDEA in 2006 after the completion of a study of this disability 
begun in 1990. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with 
Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46, 450 (Aug. 14, 2006) (now codified at 34 C.F.R. § 
300.8(c)(9)) (2011). The other growing category, developmental delays, was 
expanded in 1986 (for children from infancy to age two) and again in 1997 (for 
children between the ages of three and nine). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B) (2006). 
70
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006) (reflecting the addition of autism).  
71
 ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 36 (documenting that the American Psychiatric 
Association included Asperger’s Syndrome for the first time in the DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS in 1994 when it published its 
fourth edition and also documenting that the World Health Organization (WHO) 
included Asperger’s Syndrome for the first time in the INTERNATIONAL 
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES in 1993 when it published its tenth edition).  
72
 See SNYDER & DILLOW, supra note 54, at 84 tbl.50.  
73
 Id.  
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was added to the IDEA, this growth appears to have peaked at 
approximately .6% of the total public school population.74  
Third, despite the general growth in the nation’s special education 
programming (which now appears to have leveled off or to be leveling 
off), the corollary concern that education for children without disabilities 
has suffered as a result of this growth remains unjustified. General 
education students in the nation’s public schools have shown improved 
ability in reading and mathematics in national assessments from the mid-
1970s when the Education for All Handicapped Children Act first 
became effective through today.75 According to the most recent 
standardized assessments of the nation’s public school students, general 
education and special education have improved and grown together. 
In reading [according to the United States Department of 
Education’s 2008 general education assessments], 
average scores increased at all three ages [tested]. . . . 
Average scores were 12 points higher than in 1971 for 9-
year-olds and 4 points higher for 13-year-olds. The 
average reading score for 17-year-olds was not 
significantly different from that in 1971. 
In mathematics, average scores for 9- and 13-year-olds 
increased since 2004, while the average score for 17-
year-olds did not change significantly. . . . Average 
scores were 24 points higher than in 1973 for 9-year-
olds and 15 points higher for 13-year-olds. The average 
mathematics score for 17-year-olds was not significantly 
different from that in 1973.76 
National educational assessments thus do not support allegations that 
special education has grown at the expense of general education. In no 
measure and in no age group has learning deteriorated for general 
education students since the 1970s as children with disabilities have 
begun to enjoy access to an appropriate education for the first time. 
                                                     
74
 Id. This disability designation stability under the IDEA exists even though the 
identified prevalence of autism spectrum disorders in general increased from 
approximately one in 150 children in 2002, to 1 in 125 children in 2004, to 1 in 
110 children in 2006, and to 1 in 88 children in 2008.  John Baio, Prevalence of 
Autism Spectrum Disorders – Autism and Developmental Disabilities 
Monitoring Network, 14 Sites, United States, 2008, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 
(March 30, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
ss6103a1.htm?s_cid=ss6103a1_w. 
75
 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAEP 2008 TRENDS 
IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS: THE NATION’S REPORT CARD 2–3 (2008), 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2008/2009479_1.pdf.  
76
 Id. at 2.  
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Instead, general education students are continuing to learn at the same 
levels and in most cases at even higher levels than before.77 
Not only do government statistics demonstrate the fallacy of 
assumptions that “too many” children may now receive diagnoses for 
mild autistic symptoms creating improper growth in this disability 
diagnosis, but social science data (and its absence in critical places) and 
common sense also confirm the fallacy.78 Initially, of course, it bears 
recognizing that there is no research or data to support this fear of 
improper over-diagnosis of autism.79 Even scholars seeking anecdotal 
evidence to justify the existence of this popular concern have come up 
with nothing.80  
Additionally, there is ample evidence demonstrating, contrary to the 
fears of special education critics, that parents affirmatively resist 
diagnosis in their children and grieve when a child receives a disability 
diagnosis.81 In the context of Asperger’s Syndrome, the focus of this 
                                                     
77
 See id.  
78
 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 60, at 126–27 (stating in the context of dyslexia 
that “for those who understand [disability] and its tremendous costs to the 
individual, the very idea that someone would willingly seek such a diagnosis is 
absurd” and that “the stigma of the label makes it something no one would 
accept unless a severe underlying problem led the person to seek help”).  
79
 Weber, supra note 60, at 126 (stating that “[i]t has also become clear that . . . 
the charge that rich parents buy [learning disability] diagnoses for their children 
in order to secure accommodations that confer a competitive advantage in 
school, is an urban legend”); Hensel, supra note 40, at 1191 (“There is little 
evidence, however, that the number of children identified as IDEA-eligible . . . 
reflects improper classification rather than a heightened awareness of rights and 
acceptance of disability in education.”). In fact, some contend that “[c]ontrary to 
assertions that ASD [autism spectrum disorder] is over diagnosed, evidence 
suggests that the opposite is the case – namely, that racial and ethnic minorities, 
women and girls, adults and individuals from rural and low-income 
communities face challenges in accessing diagnoses, even where they clearly fit 
criteria under the DSM-IV.” Autism Society & ASN, The Joint Statement of the 
Autism Society and Autistic Self Advocacy Network on the DSM-5 and Autism, 
AUTISM SOCIETY (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.autism-society.org/news/in-the-
news/the-joint-statement-of-the.html?.  
80
 See SALLY SHAYWITZ, OVERCOMING DYSLEXIA 164 (2003) (“I am puzzled by 
the often-repeated notion that some students pretend to be dyslexic. When asked 
about this, I always respond by asking in turn, ‘Do you know this for a fact? Are 
you personally aware of such a case?’ Invariably the person shakes her head and 
replies, ‘Oh no, it’s just something I’ve heard.’ Such notions are nonsense.”).  
81
 “Very few things indeed are worse than learning that your child has autism.” 
CHILDREN WITH AUTISM: A PARENT’S GUIDE, supra note 61, at 47; see also 
Hensel, supra note 40, at 1193–97 (recognizing the powerful stigma associated 
with diagnosis of a disability as an effective deterrent against seeking a 
diagnosis where it is not warranted); Weber, supra note 60, at 126–27 (stating in 
the context of dyslexia that “for those who understand [disability] and its 
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Article, diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder in a child often is “a 
devastating shock to parents” that causes “pain so searing that even years 
later, the memory automatically causes tears.”82  
Finally, even if parents would and could obtain unjustified diagnoses 
of Asperger’s Syndrome or autism in non-disabled children, the total 
eligibility analysis remains sufficiently stringent that a parent’s privately-
obtained diagnosis would not qualify the child for special education 
under the IDEA on its own.83 Instead, a parent’s privately-obtained 
diagnosis would merely set in motion a comprehensive eligibility 
determination by an Individualized Education Program Team, including 
both regular and special educators in most cases.84 Only if the team were 
to agree that the child satisfied the many requirements of a qualifying 
disabling condition, including that it adversely affected educational 
performance, and that the child needed special education and related 
services because of that qualifying disability, would the child ultimately 
earn eligibility. Further, even if a handful of mildly symptomatic 
students satisfy this comprehensive eligibility analysis after a close case, 
it “is unlikely to loose the torrent of IDEA claims forecast” by critics.85 
Nonetheless, criticism that too many mildly-disabled children find 
protection in the Act continues, and scholars now recognize that “[a]t the 
heart of the [IDEA’s] eligibility debate is the question of which children 
are ‘disabled enough’ to qualify for protection and services under the 
statute . . . .”86 
 
                                                                                                                      
tremendous costs to the individual, the very idea that someone would willingly 
seek such a diagnosis is absurd” and that “the stigma of the label makes it 
something no one would accept unless a severe underlying problem led the 
person to seek help”).  
82
 CHILDREN WITH AUTISM: A PARENT’S GUIDE, supra note 61, at 47.  
83
 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
84
 Id.  
85
 Mr. I ex rel. L.I.v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 
2007). 
86
 Hensel, supra note 40, at 1151; see also, e.g., Weber, supra note 60, at 84 
(“Many difficult issues with [the IDEA’s] interpretation have been resolved, and 
others have developed into clear splits of authority, but few areas are so 
thoroughly unsettled, with so few guideposts, as eligibility for special education 
services under the statute.”); Garda, supra note 60, at 292 (“Courts, hearing 
officers, and eligibility teams often misapply [the IDEA’s] intricate eligibility 
requirements, leading to both over-identification and under-identification of 
IDEA eligible children.”); Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility 
Requirements Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 MO. L. 
REV. 441, 451 (2004) (asserting that the “overriding question” of eligibility 
under the IDEA is “whether children passing from grade to grade may still be 
IDEA eligible” or whether those children are not sufficiently disabled). 
270 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 19:2 
B. BACKGROUND ON REGULATORY DEFINITIONS OF DISABLING 
CONDITIONS AND “ADVERSE EFFECTS” ON “EDUCATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE” 
The question of which children are “disabled enough” to qualify for 
protection and services under the IDEA has presented itself to the courts 
with increasing frequency in recent years.87 Although Congress 
consistently has declined to limit the reach of the Act, instead expanding 
the Act’s coverage to more children, some courts now do otherwise 
through restrictive interpretations of the Department of Education’s 
definitions of a “child with a disability.” In cases where school districts 
agree with parents that the child at issue has a disability that could 
qualify for eligibility for special education services, courts narrowly 
construe the IDEA’s eligibility requirements in one of two ways: (1) they 
narrowly construe the Department of Education regulations requiring 
qualifying disabilities to “adversely affect[] . . . educational 
performance”88 to exclude those children with passing grades;89 or (2) 
they narrowly construe the IDEA’s requirement that children with 
                                                     
87
 See, e.g., Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. v. C.D., 616 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(considering the question of whether a child with Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, 
hypermobile type, along with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, inattentive 
type, qualified for special educational services under the IDEA when he was 
performing at grade level in his academic classes); C.B. v. Dep’t of Educ., 322 
F. Appx. 20 (2d Cir. 2009) (considering the question of whether a child with 
bipolar disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder but who tested 
above grade level on academic assessments qualified for special educational 
services under the IDEA); A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010) (considering the question of whether a child on the autism spectrum with 
Asperger’s Syndrome and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder who 
experienced behavioral and social challenges at school but had average to above 
average grades was sufficiently disabled to qualify for services under the 
IDEA); Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (considering the question of whether a child with Asperger’s Syndrome, 
attention deficit disorder, dysgraphia, and several other diagnosed disabilities 
was eligible for special education services under the IDEA when he had 
impaired social and emotional development, but otherwise excelled 
academically in school). 
88
 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (2011) (including a requirement in the definitions of 
IDEA-eligible disabilities that those disabilities “adversly affect[] . . . 
educational performance” in each case except with specific learning disabilities 
as defined in subsection (c)(10)).  
89
 See, e.g., C.D., 616 F.3d 632 (applying a restrictive definition of the IDEA 
eligibility standard to deny the IDEA’s protections to a child with several 
disabling conditions); C.B., 322 F. Appx. 20 (same); A.J., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299 
(same); Maus, 688 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same). But cf. Mr. I., 480 
F.3d at 1 (declining to adopt a restrictive construction of the IDEA’s eligibility 
terms).  
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qualifying disabilities “need special education and related services.”90 
This Article focuses on the first of these.91 
As has been well-documented elsewhere, the IDEA provides that 
children with disabilities are eligible for special educational services and 
protection if they (1) meet the statute’s age requirements,92 (2) have one 
(or more) of the disabling conditions listed in the statute93 as defined by 
the Department of Education,94 and (3) by reason of that condition need 
“special education and related services.”95 This Article focuses on courts’ 
constructions of the second element – having a disabling condition 
enumerated under the IDEA and defined by the Department of 
Education96 – as applied to children who have Asperger’s Syndrome and 
receive passing grades in school. 
                                                     
90
 See, e.g., Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D., 503 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that a child with an ADHD was not eligible for services because he 
did not “need special education services because his educational performance 
[was] adequate without them” under the third prong of the eligibility analysis).  
91
 For a discussion of courts’ construction of the second, see Hensel, supra note 
40, at 1174–78. 
92
 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“In general[,] [a] free appropriate 
education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State 
between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, including children with disabilities who 
have been suspended or expelled from school.”); see also 20 U.S.C. § 
1412(a)(1)(B) (2006) (limiting the eligibility of children between the ages of 3 
and 21 inclusive under particular circumstances such as when a child is 
incarcerated in an adult correctional facility and was not identified as a child 
with a disability prior to that incarceration); 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a), (a)(3)(i) 
(2011) (limiting the eligibility of children with disabilities to those that have not 
already received a regular high school diploma). 
93
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (establishing that a child with 
a disability may be a child “with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments 
(including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments 
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or 
specific learning disabilities”); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2006) 
(establishing that a child with a disability may also include children aged 3 
through 9 who are “experiencing developmental delays . . . in 1 or more of the 
following areas: physical development; cognitive development; communication 
development; social or emotional development; or adaptive development”).  
94
 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)–(13) (2011) (providing the regulatory definitions and 
additional requirements necessary to qualify as “having” one of the disabling 
conditions identified in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2011)). 
95
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii), (3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
96
 Not all scholars characterize the eligibility standards under the IDEA such 
that the second element of the eligibility analysis is the “having-a-disabling-
condition” element. While most scholars recognize the three eligibility 
components as noted here (see, e.g., Weber, supra note 60, at 89 (“Children with 
disabilities are eligible for services under the Act if they [1] meet age standards, 
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Under the second element of this analysis, the Act defines “child 
with a disability” to include a child with any one or a combination of 
twelve specified disabling conditions97 or, under some circumstances 
with children ages three through nine, certain types of developmental 
delays that do not qualify as one of the twelve statutorily-enumerated 
impairments.98 The IDEA does not further define any of the twelve 
conditions. The regulations implementing the IDEA, however, define 
each of the enumerated disabling conditions, except “specific learning 
disability,” to require, inter alia, an “adverse[] affect[] . . . [on] 
educational performance.”99  
                                                                                                                      
[2] have a condition listed in the statute, and [3] by reason of the condition, need 
‘special education and related services.’”)), they may also focus on three 
slightly different elements. Id. at 103. When scholars refocus the eligibility 
analysis, they de-emphasize the age requirement (which is rarely at issue in 
litigation) and separate the components of the “having-a-disabling-condition” 
element into two parts. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 40, at 1163 (stating that 
“[t]aken together, a child must show three things to qualify under the IDEA: (1) 
an enumerated impairment which (2) adversely affects educational performance 
and creates (3) a need for special education and related services,” without 
emphasizing the age requirement); Garda, supra note 86, at 459 (stating that in 
order to qualify for special education services an eligibility team must find that 
“the child is of qualifying age and (1) has an enumerated disability, (2) the 
disability adversely affects educational performance, and (3) by reason thereof 
the child needs special education.”). Though these leading scholars shift focus 
away from the age requirement and specifically enumerate the “adversely 
effects educational performance” regulatory requirement as a separate 
“element” in the eligibility analysis, this Article does not do that because the 
“adversely effects educational performance” regulatory requirement does not 
apply in all cases. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(10) (2011) (defining specific 
learning disabilities without a separate requirement that children with specific 
learning disabilities demonstrate that their disabling conditions adversely effect 
their educational performance).  
97
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (defining “child with a 
disability” to include children with (1) intellectual disabilities, (2) hearing 
impairments, (3) deafness, (4) speech or language impairments, (5) visual 
impairments, (6) blindness, (7) serious emotional disturbance, (8) orthopedic 
impairments, (9) autism, (10) traumatic brain injury, (11) other health 
impairments, or (12) specific learning disabilities).  
98
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(ii) (2006) (defining “child with a disability” to 
include children ages three through nine who are “experiencing developmental 
delays as defined by the State . . . in [one] or more of the following areas: 
physical development; cognitive development; communication development; 
social or emotional development; or adaptive development”). 
99
 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i) (2011) (defining “autism” to require that the 
condition “adversely affects a child’s educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 
300.8(c)(3) (2011) (defining “deafness” to require that the condition “adversely 
affects a child’s educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4) (2011) 
(defining “emotional disturbance” to require that the condition “adversely 
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On its face, this qualification on the definition of each disability for 
purposes of the Act makes intuitive sense. Broadly understood, it is 
consistent with the goal of the IDEA to ensure that “all children with 
disabilities” receive an appropriate education.100 The regulatory 
qualification – that in order to be recognized as a disabling condition for 
purposes of the Act a disability must negatively impact performance at 
school – aligns with the IDEA’s purpose because if a disability does not 
have any negative impact on school, the child does not require the 
individualized services and protections afforded by the IDEA in order to 
succeed and receive an appropriate education there.  
However, because neither the IDEA nor the regulations 
implementing the Act define “adversely affect” or “educational 
performance,” federal courts have been called upon to give these words 
precise meanings. Courts have turned to state law101 or, in the absence of 
                                                                                                                      
affects a child’s educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(5) (2011) 
(defining “hearing impairment” to require that the condition “adversely affects a 
child’s educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(6) (2011) (defining 
“mental retardation” to require that the condition “adversely affects a child’s 
educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(8) (2011) (defining 
“orthopedic impairment” to require that the condition “adversely affects a 
child’s educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9)(ii) (2011) (defining 
“other health impairment” to require that the condition “[a]dversely affects a 
child’s educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(11) (2011) (defining 
“speech or language impairment” to require that the condition “adversely affects 
a child’s educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(12) (2011) (defining 
“traumatic brain injury” to require that the condition “adversely affects a child’s 
educational performance”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(13) (2011) (defining “visual 
impairment including blindness” to require that the condition “adversely affects 
a child’s educational performance”); cf. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(10) (2011) 
(defining “specific learning disability” without requiring that the condition 
adversely affects a child’s educational performance but recognizing that 
inherent in a specific learning disability diagnosis is a determination that there is 
a “disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in 
understanding or using language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in 
the imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do 
mathematical calculations” which may accomplish the same thing as the 
“adversely affects” requirement contained in the definitions of the other 
disabling conditions). 
100
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
101
 See, e.g., J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 66–68 (2d Cir. 
2000) (applying Vermont’s law to narrowly construe the meaning of the 
eligibility requirements under the IDEA); Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 
688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York’s law in an 
Asperger’s Syndrome case to narrowly construe the meaning of the eligibility 
requirements under the IDEA to require that a disability have an “adverse 
impact on academic performance as opposed to social development or 
integration”) (citing C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-0881, 2009 WL 
928093, at * 1 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2009) and Mr. N.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 
274 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 19:2 
state law, to convenient canons of statutory construction102 to build that 
meaning. State-law definitions and statutorily-implied definitions of 
“adversely affects” and “educational performance” in many cases have 
restricted eligibility under the IDEA in a manner inconsistent with the 
Act.103  
Although a handful of courts conclude that the words “adversely 
affect” mean any adverse effect without qualification,104 others require 
significant adverse effects on a child’s educational performance before a 
child may be eligible for services under the IDEA based upon that child’s 
disabling condition.105 Similarly, while some courts conclude that the 
                                                                                                                      
No. 07-1077, 2008 WL 4874535, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2008)); Hood v. 
Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on 
California law to narrowly construe the meaning of eligibility requirements 
under the IDEA to determine that if a child makes adequate academic progress 
in school with services offered outside an obligation under the IDEA, that child 
cannot suggest that he does not make academic progress to secure the same 
protections under the IDEA); A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York law in an Asperger’s Syndrome case to 
narrowly construe the meaning of the eligibility requirements under the IDEA to 
require an adverse academic affect on school performance rather than an 
adverse social or behavioral impact on school performance); cf. Mr. I. ex rel. 
L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 11–13 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(applying Maine’s law to read the IDEA’s eligibility requirements broadly to be 
inclusive).  
102
 See, e.g., Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D., 503 F.3d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(relying on statutory construction and decisions on non-eligibility matters to 
conclude that passing grades ranging from an A to a D disqualified a child with 
a recognized disability who had previously been served under the IDEA and 
who currently suffered admitted behavioral and emotional challenges in school 
from eligibility under the IDEA, but doing so under the “needs” element of the 
eligibility analysis rather than under the “has-a-disabling-condition” element); 
Hood, 486 F.3d at 1107 (relying on statutory construction and a decision of the 
Supreme Court in the non-eligibility context to bolster a conclusion that state 
laws restrict eligibility under the IDEA to situations in which the child with a 
disability cannot make academic progress with supports offered outside the 
IDEA). 
103
 See infra notes 104, 106, and 182–85 and accompanying text. 
104
 See, e.g., Mr. I., 480 F.3d at 13 (declining to “infer such a limitation from 
Maine’s regulatory silence”); A.J., 679 F. Supp. 2d. at 311 (stating that “the term 
‘adversely affects’ should be given its ordinary meaning and that no qualifier 
such as ‘severe’ or ‘significant’ should be inferred”); see also Garda, supra note 
86, at 483–86 (surveying the case law on the meaning of “adversely affects”). 
105
 See, e.g., Gregory M. ex rel. Ernest M. v. State Bd. of Educ., 891 F. Supp. 
695, 698–702 (D. Conn. 1995) (requiring a child’s education to be “significantly 
impeded” to be adversely affected and holding that receiving Cs and Ds was not 
a significant impediment even though the child was “oppositional, disruptive, 
and distractible” and his grades had deteriorated); see also Garda, supra note 
86, at 483–86 (surveying the case law on the meaning of “adversely affects”). 
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words “educational performance” include any performance at school 
(including academic performance, behavioral performance, social 
performance, emotional performance, attendance, etc.),106 others 
interpret the words “educational performance” to include only one kind 
of performance at school, namely academic performance reflected by 
grades.107 Most courts today opt for constructions that restrict eligibility 
through one or both of these critical regulatory terms.108 
When courts restrict eligibility, they employ one of two analytical 
approaches. After recognizing the lack of legislative or administrative 
guidance about the meaning of “adversely affect” or “educational 
performance,” they then turn either to state law to fill in the gap109 or to 
other, unrelated provisions of the IDEA in search of meaning.110 The 
flawed outcome arising from each of these options is addressed in Parts 
II and III of this Article. 
Regardless of the expressed justification, opting for a limiting 
interpretation of “adversely affects” or “educational performance” 
typically restricts access to the IDEA to children with disabilities who 
experience significant adverse effects on academic performance at 
school.111 Under this interpretation, courts have held, for example, that 
“there is insufficient evidence that [a child’s] educational performance 
                                                     
106
 See, e.g., Mr. I., 480 F.3d at 17. 
107
 See, e.g., Hood, 486 F.3d at 1110 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on California law 
to narrowly construe the meaning of eligibility requirements under the IDEA to 
determine that if a child makes adequate academic progress in school with 
services offered outside an obligation under the IDEA, that child cannot suggest 
that he does not make academic progress to secure the same protections under 
the IDEA); J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 66–68 (2d Cir. 
2000) (applying Vermont’s law to narrowly construe the meaning of the 
eligibility requirements under the IDEA); Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 
688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.NY. 2010) (applying New York’s law in an 
Asperger’s Syndrome case to narrowly construe the meaning of the eligibility 
requirements under the IDEA to require that a disability have an “adverse 
impact on academic performance as opposed to social development or 
integration”) (citing C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-0881, 2009 WL 
0881, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2009) and Mr. N.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 
07-1077, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2008)); A.J., 679 F. Supp. 2d at 302 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York law in an Asperger’s Syndrome case to 
narrowly construe the meaning of the eligibility requirements under the IDEA to 
require an adverse academic effect on school performance rather than an 
adverse social or behavioral impact on school performance). 
108
 Hensel, supra note 40, at 1169 (“More commonly . . . courts have taken a 
narrow approach and equated ‘educational performance’ strictly with ‘academic 
performance.’”).  
109
 See supra notes 104-108 and infra note 127. 
110
 See supra notes 104-108 and infra note 247. 
111
 See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. 
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was adversely affected” when a child’s grade-point average declined by 
nine points in a single school year, but the child did not receive an “F” in 
any of his classes.112 With “only” a nine-point drop in GPA, the disabling 
condition’s impact on educational performance was insufficiently 
adverse, rendering a child ineligible for services and protection under the 
Act.113 This threatens the ability of the Act to accomplish its goal of 
improving educational results and securing preparation for “employment 
. . . and independent living” for all children with disabilities,114 
particularly those children with disabilities who may also have average 
to above-average cognitive functioning, as is by definition the case for 
children with Asperger’s Syndrome.115  
C. BACKGROUND ON ASPERGER’S SYNDROME 
A wide range of children with a wide range of disabilities may and 
do, of course, have average to above-average cognitive functioning and 
receive passing grades in school, potentially rendering them ineligible 
for services under the IDEA under recent constructions of the 
requirement that disabling conditions “adversely affect[] . . . educational 
performance.” In fact, of those disabilities specifically enumerated in the 
IDEA, the overwhelming majority of them may co-exist with average to 
above-average cognitive function and passing grades in school.116 
                                                     
112
 Mr. N.C., No. 07-1077, 2008 WL at *1-2 (declining to qualify a child as 
emotionally disturbed and concluding that even if he met other requirements 
necessary to qualify as emotionally disturbed, he would nonetheless be 
ineligible for special education on that basis because the adverse effect on 
educational performance standard required proof of a greater adverse impact on 
grades than a nine-point drop in GPA, particularly when the child had not failed 
a class).  
113
 Id.  
114
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006).  
115
 DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 75–77 (stating that a diagnosis of Asperger’s 
Syndrome requires, inter alia, that “[t]here [is] no clinically significant delay in 
cognitive development”).  
116
 For example, Attention Deficit Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, Amputation, Asthma, Autism, Blindness, Cancer, Cerebral Palsy, 
Deafness, Diabetes, Dyslexia, Emotional Disturbance, Epilepsy, Hearing 
Impairment, Heart Condition, Hemophilia, Lead Poisoning, Leukemia, 
Nephritis, Orthopedic Impairment, Poliomyelitis, Rheumatic Fever, Sickle Cell 
Anemia, Speech/Language Impairment, Stuttering, Tourette Syndrome, 
Tuberculosis, and Visual Impairment are all identified in the IDEA as 
disabilities within the contemplation of the Act, and none of these disabilities 
requires any cognitive impairment. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)–(10) (2011). 
(identifying these diagnoses, among others, as covered under particular 
circumstances under the IDEA). Thus, a child with any one of these disabilities 
might have cognitive impairment, a child with one of these disabilities might 
also receive passing grades through their own hard work or exceptional ability 
such that they are excluded from the services afforded through the IDEA. This 
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However, Asperger’s Syndrome is the rare disability that has as one of 
its diagnostic criteria an affirmative requirement that the child subject to 
the diagnosis does not have any cognitive delay.117  
Asperger’s Syndrome is the focus of the analysis here for three 
reasons. First, understanding the IDEA’s eligibility requirements in this 
context is increasingly important given that recognition of autism 
spectrum disorders has increased quite significantly over the last 
decade.118 The number of school-age children with autism spectrum 
disorders served in the public schools increased from 42,000 in the 1997-
1998 school year to 296,000 in 2007-2008 school year,119 a 605% 
increase over the course of this ten-year period.120 The Center for 
Disease Control estimates that 1 in 88 children is now born with an 
                                                                                                                      
Article focuses on Asperger’s Syndrome because average to above-average 
ability is a necessary component of the diagnosis for that disability. 
117
 DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 77 (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria 
for Asperger’s Syndrome that “[t]here is no clinically significant delay in 
cognitive development”). 
118
 See Daniela Caruso, Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal Change, 
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 489–90 (2010) (recognizing that “[t]he figures 
illustrating both incidence and prevalence of autism are alarming” and 
“[w]hether or not autism qualifies as an epidemic” today, the “numbers are 
unsettling”); Ka-Yuet Liu et al., Social Influence and the Autism Epidemic, 115 
AM. J. SOC. 1387, 1389–40 (2010) (discussing the debate surrounding 
proportions of autism). 
119
 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 
2011-015, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, 2010, at tbl.45, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=64 [hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUC. 
STATISTICS] (identifying the numbers of students served with special education 
over time and in each eligibility category). It is worth noting that some children 
with autism spectrum disorders are served under categories other than the 
autism category. See, e.g., Pohorecki v. Anthony Wayne Local Sch. Dist., 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 547, 551 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (addressing a case in which the school 
district agreed that a child with Asperger’s Syndrome was eligible under the 
“emotional disturbance” category of eligibility, but not under the “autism” 
category of eligibility, because the child’s primary difficulties were 
“maintaining relationships, inappropriate behaviors and feelings, and pervasive 
depression”). 
120
 The total number of children served under the IDEA increased by only 11.8% 
over the last decade – from 5,908,000 children in the 1997–1998 school year to 
6,606,000 children in the 2007–2008 school year. DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTICS, 
supra note 119, tbl.45 (identifying the numbers of students served with special 
education as percentages of the total public education population). Notably, this 
increase does not mean that there was an 11.8% increase in the total percentage 
of special education students in the public school population because the 
percentage of “typical” children increased over the same period at a similar, 
though slightly lower, rate. 
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autism spectrum disorder,121 and some estimate that 1 in 250 children is 
now born with Asperger’s Syndrome.122  
The suspected reasons for the increase in the number of children 
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders vary.123 Some believe that the 
increase in recognition of autism exists because the current “diagnostic 
criteria for autism . . . are the most stringent and the clearest ever” 
creating “greater understanding of the behaviors associated with autism . 
. . [and] lead[ing] to an increase in the rate of diagnosis.”124 Others 
suggest that it is the “improved sophistication of professionals who 
diagnose autism” creating a broader community of experts better able to 
discern autism when it appears in children.125  
Regardless of the reason for the increase in the number of children 
recognized as on the autism spectrum, there has been a simultaneous 
increase in the amount of special education litigation arising out of 
provision (or not) of services to these children. Over the last decade, 
there have been approximately 700 federal court cases involving special 
education and individuals on the autism spectrum.126 In this context, it 
becomes particularly important to clarify the IDEA’s eligibility 
requirements to reduce the amount of time and energy families and 
educators spend on litigation and permit them to shift their attention to 
where it ought to be – on the child’s education. 
Second, Asperger’s Syndrome merits focused attention because 
recently several courts have restricted the definition of qualifying 
disabilities in a manner that has particular relevance to Asperger’s 
                                                     
121
 John Baio, Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders – Autism and 
Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network, 14 Sites, United States, 2008, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REPORT (March 30, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/ss6103a1.htm?s_cid=ss6103a1_w; see also Veronica Zysk, 
Autism 101:  New to Autism?, AUTISM-ASPERGER’S DIG., June-July 2011, at 9 
(recognizing that before the March 2012 Center for Disease Control report it 
was estimated that “[a]utism affects 1 in every 110 children” and is 
“consistently prevalent around the globe, and within different racial, social, and 
ethnic communities”). 
122
 ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 10 (gauging that “the prevalence of Asperger’s 
syndrome is about 1 person in 250”).  
123
 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (explaining the origin of this 
disability designation in the context of special education eligibility and 
demonstrating that despite early increases in autism designations, the numbers 
have stabilized over the most recent three years of data collection).  
124
 CHILDREN WITH AUTISM: A PARENT’S GUIDE, supra note 61, at 27 (offering 
explanations for the perception that autism is “on the rise”).  
125
 Id. 
126
 Dicker & Bennett, supra note 8, at 416 (2011).  
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Syndrome.127 This disability on the autism spectrum is one of the rare 
diagnoses that require an absence of any delay in cognitive development 
in order to qualify for the diagnosis.128 This means that children with 
Asperger’s Syndrome have average to above-average cognitive 
functioning and the intellectual ability to “pass” at grade level.129 While 
children with many other diagnoses also have average to above-average 
cognitive functioning and the intellectual ability to “pass” at grade level, 
this characteristic is not required of other diagnoses.130 Because all 
                                                     
127
 See, e.g., Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York’s law in an Asperger’s Syndrome case to 
deny eligibility by narrowly construing the meaning of the eligibility 
requirements to require that a disability have an “adverse impact on academic 
performance as opposed to social development or integration”); see also A.J. v. 
Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York 
law in an Asperger’s Syndrome case to deny eligibility by narrowly construing 
the meaning of the eligibility requirements under the IDEA to require an 
adverse academic effect on school rather than an adverse social or behavioral 
impact on school performance). Notably, however, judicial interpretations of the 
definitions of disabling conditions under the IDEA to exclude children who 
receive passing grades from access to the Act’s services and protections affect 
children with a wide range of disabilities, not only children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome. See, e.g., C.B. v. Dep't of Educ., 322 Fed. Appx. 20 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a child with bipolar disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder was ineligible for services and protections under the IDEA because the 
child managed to get good grades and test “above grade-level” despite his 
disabilities and was therefore not disabled for purposes of the Act); see also 
Garda, supra note 86, at 463 (emphasizing the impact of restrictive construction 
of eligibility requirements on emotionally-disturbed students and recognizing 
that “[t]he narrow meaning of educational performance is one reason that 
emotionally disturbed children are the most under-identified category of 
disabled children[;] [t]hese children can often perform well academically but 
cannot form social relations, control their behavior or attend the regular 
classroom consistently”). While it is clear that a narrow construction of the 
IDEA’s qualifying disabilities impacts students with a variety of diagnoses and 
disabilities, this Article focuses on Asperger’s Syndrome as an example for the 
three reasons identified. 
128
 See DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 77 (identifying as one of the diagnostic 
criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome that “[t]here is no clinically significant delay 
in cognitive development”).  
129
 See, e.g., Marlette, supra note 30, at 58 (stating that children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome “may receive good grades”); ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 232 
(noting that children with Asperger’s Syndrome “may have an IQ that suggests 
the intellectual potential to achieve good grades in school work”); Caruso, supra 
note 118, at 518 (recognizing that many children with Asperger’s Syndrome and 
high-functioning autism “have average or high intelligence” and thus have been 
denied the need for individualized instruction in schools). 
130
 Of course, a child with an emotional disability, a learning disability, or 
almost any other type of disability is just as likely as a child without such a 
disability to have average, above-average, or below-average cognitive ability. 
Many children with an emotional disability or a learning disability, for example, 
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children with Asperger’s Syndrome are without cognitive delay by 
definition, they are disproportionately vulnerable to any construction of 
eligibility for special education that would exclude children who receive 
passing grades in school.131  
Finally, this Article focuses on Asperger’s Syndrome because there is 
a shortage of scholarship on the effect of the IDEA’s eligibility terms in 
this context.132 Several authors have addressed important concerns 
associated with under-identification (or disproportionate exclusion) of 
children who ought to qualify for special educational services in the 
“emotionally disturbed,” “other health impaired,” and “learning 
disabled” categories of eligibility.133 Still others have addressed critical 
concerns associated with the improper over-identification (or 
disproportionate inclusion) of African-Americans in particular eligibility 
categories (not autism).134 This Article offers a comparably in-depth 
consideration of the recent constructions of the IDEA’s eligibility 
                                                                                                                      
often can and do pass at grade level. Occasionally, however, a child with one of 
these disabilities does not have this ability and cannot pass at grade level. 
Average to above-average cognitive ability is not required to co-exist with other 
disorders. 
131
 See Melissa J. Sullivan, Brilliantly Disabled, 29 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 49 
(2009) (discussing three cases in which children with Asperger’s Syndrome 
experienced problems with eligibility for special education services under the 
IDEA because they found themselves able to perform academically despite their 
disabilities). 
132
 But see Caruso, supra note 118, at 518 (generally discussing the impact of 
autism on the law in a variety of contexts and asserting briefly that special 
education “[e]ligibility can also pose thorny problems [because] [e]ven in the 
presence of an autism spectrum disorder (most often, Asperger’s Syndrome), 
schools have denied the need for individualized instruction”); Sullivan, supra 
note 131, at 49 (discussing three cases in which children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome were excluded from special educational services at least initially and 
proposing educational and advocacy solutions).  
133
 See, e.g., Garda, supra note 86, at 450 (addressing serious emotional 
disturbance); Hensel, supra note 40, at 1164–67 (addressing serious emotional 
disturbance, specific learning disability, and briefly other health impairments); 
Weber, supra note 60, at 109–14, 123–27 (addressing emotional disturbance and 
social maladjustment, and learning disabilities respectively).  
134
 See Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION vi, xxiii, 1, 3 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002) 
(addressing data and theory on disproportionate over-representation of racial 
minorities in special education); Weber, supra note 60, at 143–51 (addressing 
African American over-representation in the mentally retarded and emotional 
disturbance categories); see also Garda, supra note 86, at 450 (“The confusion 
surrounding eligibility standards leads to the disastrous results of both over-
identification and under-identification of IDEA eligible children.”). 
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requirements as applied to children on the autism spectrum with 
Asperger’s Syndrome.135 
As background, this section begins with a discussion of Asperger’s 
Syndrome and its place within the autism spectrum.136 At this time, there 
are five primary diagnoses within the autism spectrum: Autistic 
Disorder, Rett’s Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, and Asperger’s 
Disorder (or Syndrome).137 These five diagnoses on the autism spectrum 
form a continuum with Autistic Disorder being the most “severe” form 
of autism and Asperger’s Syndrome having the most promising 
prognosis on the spectrum.138 Generally speaking, however, autism in 
each of its five types “is a developmental disorder, typically diagnosed 
during the first three years of life. It is neurological in nature, affecting 
the brain in four major areas of functioning: language/communication, 
social skills, sensory systems, and behavior.”139 It has no cure and is a 
lifelong condition.140  
Given that all five types of autism are “defined by a common set of 
behaviors” and that “differentiation of autism spectrum disorder[s] from 
typical development and other ‘nonspectrum’ disorders is done reliably 
and with validity[,] while distinctions among [sub-categories of autism] 
have been found to be inconsistent over time,” the American Psychiatric 
Association is considering merging the multiple autistic types into a 
single diagnosis when it releases the Fifth Edition of its Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 2013.141 This consolidation of 
                                                     
135
 Others, however, have addressed autism spectrum disorders with respect to 
other components of the IDEA. See, e.g., Caruso, supra note 118; Dicker & 
Bennett, supra note 8; Marlette, supra note 30.  
136
 See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text (offering data regarding the 
numbers of children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders who are served 
under the IDEA and the volume of special education litigation involving 
individuals on the autism spectrum).  
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 DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 66–78 (identifying the diagnostic criteria for each 
of the five diagnoses on the autism spectrum). 
138
 NAT’L INST. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS: 
PERVASIVE DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 2 (2007), http://wwwapps.nimh. 
nih.gov/health/publications/autism/nimhautismspectrum.pdf (“The pervasive 
developmental disorders, or autism spectrum disorders, range from a severe 
form, called autistic disorder, to a milder form, Asperger syndrome.”). 
139
 Zysk, supra 121, at 9.  
140
 See CHILDREN WITH AUTISM: A PARENT’S GUIDE, supra note 61, at 29 
(stating that although a hope of a “cure” or “recovery” is “seductive,” “[g]iven 
our current state of knowledge of the biological, genetic, and neurological 
nature of this disorder, however, an emphasis on cure and recovery is ill-
advised”).  
141
 American Psychiatric Association, A 09 Autism Spectrum Disorder, DSM-V 
DEVELOPMENT (2010), http://www.dsm5.org/proposedrevision/pages/proposed 
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multiple existing autism spectrum disorder diagnoses under a single 
diagnostic label is not final, however, and Asperger’s Syndrome and its 
particular collection of neurological features will continue to exist in 
children even if its label changes over time.142 
Asperger’s Syndrome in particular has been defined in courts as “a 
developmental disability on the autism spectrum that is associated with 
significant misperceptions of otherwise routine elements of daily life. It 
is a permanent condition that is not treatable with medication.”143 The 
current edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders provides that “[t]he essential 
features of Asperger’s Disorder are severe and sustained impairment in 
social interaction . . . and the development of restricted, repetitive 
patterns of behavior, interests, and activities. . . . The disturbance must 
cause clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning.”144 “Recent research studies and review 
papers [also] have confirmed an unusual pattern of sensory perception 
and reaction” particularly in individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s 
Syndrome.145 Some now consider the sensory challenges of children 
with Asperger’s Syndrome to be their most significant, and believe that 
“sensory integration dysfunction is at the root of many of the core 
                                                                                                                      
revision.aspx?rid=94# (also stating that the “[n]ew name for [the] category, 
autism spectrum disorder, [] includes autistic disorder (autism), Asperger’s 
disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, and pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified” and that the DSM-V will be released in May 
2013); see also Benedict Cary, New Definition of Autism May Exclude Many, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, available at http://nytimes.com/2012/01/20/health/ 
research/new-autism-definition-would-eclude-many-study-suggests.html?_r=2& 
hp=&pagewanted=print (recognizing that the new definition of autism being 
considered by the American Psychiatric Association for inclusion in the fifth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders would 
“consolidate all three diagnoses under one category, autism spectrum disorder, 
eliminating Asperger Syndrome and P.D.D.-N.O.S. from the manual”).  
142
 See Autism Society & ASAN, Joint Statement of the Autism Society and the 
Autism Self Advocacy Network on the DSM-V and Autism, AUTISM SOCIETY 
(Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.autism-society.org/news/in-the-news/the-joint-
statement-of-the.html (emphasizing that “it is essential that the DSM-5’s criteria 
are structured in such a way to ensure that those who have or would have 
qualified for a diagnosis under the DSM-IV maintain access to an ASD 
diagnosis” and clarifying that this is important even for higher-functioning 
individuals on the spectrum “who may have managed to discover coping 
strategies and other adaptive mechanisms which serve to mask traits of ASD 
prior to a diagnosis”). 
143
 Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 154 (1st Cir. 2004).  
144
 DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 75. 
145
 ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 271.  
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difficulties of autism spectrum disorders.”146 For this reason, some 
scholars are “frustrated by the fact that some teachers and therapists still 
do not recognize the importance of sensory over sensibility” in children 
on the spectrum.147 Significantly for purposes of this Article, in addition 
to the significant social, behavioral, communication, and sensory 
impairments associated with Asperger’s Syndrome, this disability also by 
definition excludes any “clinically[-]significant delay in cognitive 
development” or any “clinically[-]significant general delay in 
language.”148 Because children with Asperger’s Syndrome by definition 
have average to above-average cognitive functioning, children with 
Asperger’s Syndrome often receive “passing” academic marks despite 
their significant disabilities.149  
“Although the person with Asperger’s [S]yndrome may achieve 
academic success” in school, when children with Asperger’s Syndrome 
become adults, “difficulties with social skills” may impact their ability to 
“get[] and keep[] a job.”150 Scholars recognize the likelihood of “a high 
rate” of chronic unemployment in individuals with Asperger’s 
Syndrome.151 Without special education in social skills, pragmatic 
communication, and behavior, individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome 
may have difficulty communicating in job interviews, working with 
teams in employment, understanding social conventions like standing 
too close to others or looking at them too long or not at all, and 
discerning and accepting the organizational hierarchy.152 
Likewise, the acute sensory responses of individuals with autism 
spectrum disorders can create challenges for high-functioning adults 
with autism in the workplace. One scholar recounts the case of Cathleen 
Comber, an individual with autism who found initial success in 
employment and got along with most of her fellow workers until 
overwhelmed by a sensory challenge at work.153 When she was asked to 
drive a company van, Ms. Comber refused because the van smelled like 
deodorant and triggered in her an atypical olfactory reaction due to her 
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hyper-sensitive olfactory perception, a common symptom of autism.154 
Upon her refusal, Ms. Comber was reproached by a supervisor, then Ms. 
Comber reacted in a socially atypical manner (throwing a fit and kicking 
a chair across the hall), and was fired promptly the next day.155 Ms. 
Comber “was penalized, vis-à-vis other ADA-eligible workers, because 
of her extraordinary ability to navigate her way through life [in most 
instances] – a feature that is common among persons with high 
functioning autism, but does not diminish the severity of the 
impairment” when not accommodated by an employer and beyond the 
individual’s power to address through self-coping strategies.156 This 
example illustrates that “integrating this particular disability in the 
workforce remains plagued by the endemic fuzziness of ADA standards, 
exponentially complicated by the fuzziness of autism science itself.”157 
Before reaching adulthood, of course, children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome experience practical impacts of their disability on non-
academic performance at school, even though they “may achieve 
academic success.”158 Symptoms of Asperger’s Syndrome present 
challenges to a child’s ability to manage the “routine elements” of school 
life.159 For example, children with Asperger’s Syndrome may face 
challenges processing oral instructions from teachers through the 
diversity of competing sounds in their hyper-sensitive ears, including the 
sounds of chairs scraping, papers rustling, children whispering, air-
conditioning units humming, feet shuffling, pencils sharpening, pages 
turning, and even lawn mowers mowing outside, airplanes flying 
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 Id. Hyposensitive (or even nonresponsive) sensory perception is also a 
possible symptom of autism spectrum disorders. See, e.g., NOTBOHM & ZYSK, 
supra note 146, at 2 (recognizing that individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders may have either “hyper-acute” or “hypo-active” sensory systems that 
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with Ms. Comber here. See Caruso, supra note 116, at 513 (describing Ms. 
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 Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. CIV.JFM-99-2637, 2000 WL 1481300, at *1–
2 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000). 
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 Caruso, supra note 118, at 513. 
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 ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 22. It may also impact academic performance, 
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resulting in additional co-morbid concerns, like depression and high anxiety, 
arising out of the stress of coping with Asperger’s Syndrome without support. 
See Mr. I ex rel. L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 
2007) (recognizing that plaintiff had a “depressive disorder brought on by the 
stress of managing” her Asperger’s Syndrome and the pragmatic language skill 
and social understanding difficulties brought about by that disability). 
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 See Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 154 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(stating that children with Asperger’s Syndrome experience “significant 
misperceptions of otherwise routine elements of daily life”). 
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overhead, people talking or walking in the hallways, and so on at 
school.160 Quite basic tasks like walking down the hallway may pose 
challenges for a child with Asperger’s: “The corridors and halls of 
almost any mainstream school are a constant tumult of noises echoing, 
fluorescent lights (a particular source of visual and auditory stress for 
people on the autistic spectrum), bells ringing, people bumping into each 
other, the smells of cleaning products and so on,” that push typical 
people with autism “perilously close to sensory overload.”161 
Additionally, children with Asperger’s Syndrome face challenges 
processing and participating in social interactions at school;
162
 
developing appropriate peer relationships;
163
 using or reading nonverbal 
cues such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and 
gestures essential to daily life at school;164 managing behavior and 
emotions appropriately at school;
165
 communicating effectively at 
school;
166
 adjusting to changes in daily routine at school for field trips, 
special programs, in-class celebrations, or assemblies;167 escaping a pre-
occupation with a particular interest to engage in classroom activities;
168
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 See NOTBOHM, supra note 7, at 10–12 (describing the effects of hyper-acute 
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 ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 272 (quoting Claire Sainsbury, MARTIAN IN THE 
PLAYGROUND: UNDERSTANDING THE SCHOOLCHILD WITH ASPERGER’S 
SYNDROME 101 (2000)). 
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 See DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 77 (identifying as part of the diagnostic 
criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome a “lack of spontaneous” exchange with others 
as well as an “encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and 
restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus”). 
163
 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
a “failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level”).  
164
 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
a “marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-
to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social 
interaction”). 
165
 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
a number of symptoms that could produce inappropriate behavior at school). 
166
 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
an impairment in communication through inability to use nonverbal cues and 
through a lack of social or emotional reciprocity). 
167
 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
an “apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or 
rituals”).  
168
 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
an “encompassing preoccupation . . . that is abnormal either in intensity or 
focus”). 
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discontinuing stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (which may 
include hand or finger flapping or twisting or complex whole-body 
movements) associated with Asperger’s Syndrome and inappropriate for 
school;
169
 and engaging in team or group activities at school,170 among 
other things.  
Given that a child with Asperger’s Syndrome, like A.J. in the 
introductory example, is likely to find academic work at school within 
his inherent ability but find behavior, social interaction, and/or pragmatic 
communication beyond his inherent ability, these children are at the 
heart of the eligibility debate. Are they “disabled enough”? Parents, 
school districts, administrative law judges, hearing officers, and courts 
all recognize that a child with Asperger’s Syndrome has an enumerated 
disability with “clinically significant” effects on some aspects of 
performance at school, but some school systems (with the support of 
some courts) nonetheless assert that the child is not eligible for services 
under the IDEA because the effect is not sufficiently significant or 
because the child has maintained adequate academic marks.  
Why would educators avoid educating a child in areas in which it is 
agreed that the child most needs help? School systems lack resources 
and special education services for a child on the autism spectrum can be 
expensive. According to estimates contained in a report of the United 
States Government Accountability Office, “the average per pupil 
expenditure for educating a child with autism was more than $18,000 in 
the 1999-2000 school year[, and] [t]his amount is almost three times the 
average per pupil expenditure of educating a child who does not receive 
any special education services.”171 More specifically, the cost of 
educating a child with autism was $18,790 during the 1999-2000 school 
year, while the cost of educating a child without any disability was 
$6,556 during that same year.172 Unfortunately, while acknowledging the 
high cost of educating children on the autism spectrum (and of educating 
children with other disabilities), the federal government has never fully 
funded the IDEA.173 Under these circumstances, state and local 
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 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
“stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or 
twisting, or complex whole-body movements)”). 
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 See id. (identifying as one of the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome 
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governments struggle to find funding to provide educational supports 
they know their students with disabilities require, but may also exclude 
children, especially when they are doing fine academically, in an attempt 
to “save” money. The irony in schools’ attempt to “save” money in this 
manner is that when schools deny IDEA eligibility to children with 
disabilities, they do not receive federal IDEA funding to serve those 
children and may not be able to recover as much state government 
special education funding either.174 As a result, in an attempt to “save” 
money, schools may relinquish it. 
Ultimately, without adequate resources flowing into special 
education programming, many children with Asperger’s Syndrome, like 
A.J., find themselves disabled by all accounts, but not disabled enough 
to be recognized as such for purposes of the IDEA. This outcome harms 
not only a child with the disability, but also society at large. When school 
systems make decisions in their own short-term financial interests to 
deny special education to children with disabilities, they shift the 
economic burden of these disabilities back to society at large at a higher 
price. In explaining why the legislature requires investment in special 
education, the Supreme Court recognized that  
[t]he long range implications of [failing to provide 
special education] are that public agencies and taxpayers 
will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these 
individuals to maintain such persons as dependents and 
in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper 
education services, many would be able to become 
productive citizens, contributing to our society instead 
of being forced to remain burdens.175  
The costs of providing educational supports for children with 
disabilities are modest when compared to the cost to society to support 
an improperly-educated person with a disability as an adult.176 Further, 
                                                                                                                      
schools are qualified to receive $23.8 billion in federal funds. Unfortunately, 
school districts are only receiving $10.6 billion. In other words, states and 
school districts are currently receiving roughly 17.73 percent rather than the 
federal commitment of 40 percent of APPE”). 
174
 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2) (2006) (explaining that the amount of special 
education funding available to states depends upon “the number of children with 
disabilities in the State who are receiving special education and related 
services”); see also THOMAS PARRISH ET AL., STATE SPECIAL EDUCATION 
FINANCE SYSTEMS, 1999-2000, at 3-12 (2004) (describing and providing data on 
types of state financing systems). 
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 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 n.23 (1982) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
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 Glen Cheng, Note, Caring for New Jersey’s Children with Autism: A 
Multifaceted Struggle for Parity, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 997, 1005 (2008) 
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the “cost of lifelong care [for adults] can be reduced by 2/3 with early 
diagnosis and intervention [in children].”177 
Accordingly, the debate over the perimeters of special 
education eligibility should not focus on whether the 
additional costs associated with educating the 
moderately impaired should be incurred; instead, the 
focus should be on who is going to bear these costs and 
when. To the extent school districts are granted 
permission to treat these students indifferently, costs are 
merely transferred from the district to society at large. 
For example, students whose educational needs are 
ignored will have a difficult time finding employment, 
resulting in dependence on government benefits and 
welfare programs.178 
This is one reason why Congress invests money in early intervention 
and childhood education for children with disabilities through the IDEA. 
Another, of course, is that “Constitutional rights must be afforded 
citizens despite the greater expense involved . . . [and the Constitution 
requires that] available funds must be expended . . . [to provide a child 
with a disability] a publicly supported education consistent with his 
needs and ability to benefit therefrom.”179 While the IDEA requires a 
significant financial investment, it is an investment that yields valuable 
                                                                                                                      
(“Basing their estimate on [a] UK study, the Autism Society of America 
estimated the annual U.S. societal cost of autism to be $90 billion per year, with 
90% of the costs being for adult services. Lifespire Inc. estimated the total costs 
for an autistic disabled adult to be $ 225,000 per year.”) (footnotes omitted).  
177
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 Hensel, supra note 40, at 1190. 
179
 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972). There is question 
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constitutional claim based upon a deprivation of a fundamental right continues 
to exist when public schools fail to educate children with disabilities in the least 
restrictive environment or exclude them from access to education completely. 
WEBER, supra note 38, at 264. 
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dividends, embraces our legislatively-formalized national interest in 
equality of opportunity, and avoids greater expense down the road. In 
other words, it is a sound investment that pays off.  
Recalling the case of A.J., one sees an example of a child with 
Asperger’s Syndrome who required accommodations for his disability as 
a pre-school child, but who, despite significant behavioral and social 
problems, ended up managing the academic work of kindergarten, 
rendering him ineligible for critical, early-intervention special education 
services in his jurisdiction. A.J. is for now at least temporarily excluded 
from the IDEA because his “strengths . . . mask [his] areas of lesser 
ability” allowing him to “pass” academically.180  
Through courts’ restrictive interpretation of “adversely affects” and 
“educational performance,” many children like A.J. face great 
misfortune when their disabilities are not recognized simply because 
they are “able to cover up or compensate for their problems” through 
academic output.181 Ironically, these children with early academic 
success in school may – through these early achievements – lay the 
foundation for future failures in school and life unless their parents can 
afford privately to provide the special education services they are denied 
in public schools.182 While one cannot predict the path of any particular 
child, it is likely that A.J. will be considered for special educational 
services again. He is, of course, despite the court’s technical conclusion 
to the contrary, a child with a disability. He is a child with autism, and 
particularly with Asperger’s Syndrome. As time goes on, he may become 
eligible for special education services should he fall again to the point of 
academic failure as he struggles alone to accommodate his disability in 
school.183 Children with Asperger’s Syndrome who are denied 
accommodations to support their pragmatic language and behavioral 
challenges in highly sensory environments also are vulnerable to 
developing co-morbid emotional disabilities, such as depression or high 
anxiety, arising out of the stress associated with coping with the effects 
of their Asperger’s Syndrome without special education.184 Requiring 
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failure first for A.J., or any child with a disability, in order to access the 
IDEA’s services places children at risk for development of additional 
complications and is inconsistent with the plain requirements of the 
IDEA, public policy as expressed in the Act, and the Constitution. 
III. FACING THE JUDICIALLY-IMPOSED ACADEMIC “FAILURE FIRST” 
REQUIREMENT: COMING UP EMPTY-HANDED IN THE SEARCH FOR 
STATUTORY SUPPORT FOR A RESTRICTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF 
REGULATORY DEFINITIONS OF DISABLING CONDITIONS IN THE IDEA 
To keep in perspective this consideration of the “adversely 
affects . . . educational performance” component of the Department of 
Education’s definitions of disabling conditions, recall that of the three 
IDEA-eligibility requirements – age, a disabling condition, and need – 
only the second is under review here. Even when a child with passing 
grades satisfies the second element, having a disabling condition, as this 
Article argues should be the case, the child remains subject to the third 
eligibility requirement, that she “need” special education. Thus, just 
because the IDEA provides (under the argument here) that a child with a 
disability should be recognized as such even if that child earns passing 
grades at school, does not mean that children with disabilities who do 
not otherwise “need” special education will get it. Instead, this merely 
moves these children past the second eligibility requirement and gives 
them an opportunity to demonstrate “need” under the third requirement 
to render them fully eligible for services and protection under the IDEA. 
Whether federal courts turn to state law or whether they “glean a 
federal definition . . . from parts of IDEA that do not deal with 
eligibility,”185 judicial rationales that narrowly interpret “adversely 
affect” and “educational performance” to exclude children with 
disabilities and passing grades sink under the Act’s scrutiny. In every 
corner of the IDEA, this legislation expresses an inclusive understanding 
of disability and embraces children with all types of disabilities having 
all types of effects at school.  
Nothing in the IDEA requires academic failure before a child can be 
recognized as a “child with a disability.” On the contrary, both the plain 
language and the legislative history of the IDEA establish that this 
                                                                                                                      
ATTWOOD, supra note 12, at 136–42 (identifying a number of potential co-
morbid diagnoses, including the depressive disorder at issue in Mr. I, that may 
develop in children with Asperger’s Syndrome particularly if their triggers are 
not addressed and accommodated appropriately during development); WEBB ET 
AL., supra note 30, at xix (recognizing that bright children and adults are 
vulnerable to the “misfortune” of having “[t]heir disorders . . . obscured 
because, with their intelligence, they are able to cover up or compensate for 
their problems”).  
185
 Garda, supra note 86, at 464. 
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legislation welcomes all children whose disabilities impact a range of 
school performance – academic or otherwise.186 Further, the policy 
expressed by the IDEA and by Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
Act’s post-eligibility provisions demand an inclusive understanding of 
“child with a disability.”187 Likewise, the Office of Special Education 
Compliance, the entity tasked with enforcing the IDEA, has issued 
multiple opinion letters, over three decades, each of which expresses its 
position that the words “adversely affects . . . educational performance” 
do not require that a child’s disability result in bad or failing grades in 
school in order to be eligible under the Act.188 
A. THE IDEA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PLAIN LANGUAGE 
From the beginning, Congress’s purpose in the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act, and later in the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, has been to secure for “all children with disabilities” 
access to public education in which they can make meaningful progress 
on a wide range of performance measures.189 Congress consistently has 
recognized that children with disabilities have unique strengths and 
weaknesses, and not all children with disabilities have the same needs, 
making a single metric (like academic performance) for eligibility under 
the IDEA inappropriate.190 The testimony presented to Congress as it 
contemplated the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in the 
early 1970s, as well as prominent judicial decisions contemplating the 
                                                     
186
 See supra notes 190-245 and accompanying text.  
187
 See supra notes 246-68 and accompanying text.  
188
 See supra notes 269-84 and accompanying text.  
189
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); see also Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3, 89 Stat. 775 (1975) (“It is the 
purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children have available to 
them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special 
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure 
that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are 
protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all 
handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to 
educate handicapped children.") (emphasis added). Despite multiple references 
throughout the IDEA to provision of special education services for “all” 
children with disabilities, not “all” children with disabilities are covered by the 
Act. Only those children with disabilities who satisfy all three eligibility 
requirements find their way into the world of special education offered through 
this legislation. 
190
 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that 
when local educational agencies conduct evaluations for purposes of 
determining eligibility under the IDEA they must “use a variety of assessment 
tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic 
information” and that they may “not use any single measure or assessment as 
the sole criterion for determining whether the child is a child with a disability”) 
(emphasis added). 
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Constitutional underpinnings of rights of children with disabilities in 
school, recognized the wide-ranging impacts disabilities have on 
children at school. This broad understanding of disability was 
incorporated into the Act. 
Statistics compiled for Congress in the early 1970s as it considered 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act drew Congress’s 
attention to a range of handicapping conditions, each of which might or 
might not prohibit a child from earning passing grades. The Department 
of Education at that time reported that 82% of “emotionally disturbed” 
children, 82% of “hard-of-hearing” children, 67% of “deaf-blind” and 
“other multi-handicapped” children, and 88% of children classified as 
“learning disabled” required protection through the Act either because 
they were receiving inappropriate education without it or because they 
were being excluded from public schools entirely.191 At regional hearings 
held in 1973 and 1974, the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped of 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare put these statistics in 
context as it heard testimony about the failure of states to support 
children with disabilities of varying impact – from mild to severe.192 The 
Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped then discussed provision of 
support services to meet wide-ranging schooling needs. The needs 
considered at the time included, inter alia, behavior help, individualized 
tutoring, self-care training programs, specialized diagnostic evaluations, 
and speech therapy.193 Plainly, needs in “self care” or “behavior” are not 
traditionally considered “academic,” yet Congress recognized from the 
beginning that the range of disabilities requiring protection under the Act 
would impact these important, non-academic components of learning 
necessary for children to make meaningful progress in school toward 
becoming independent and self-sufficient adults. 
The spirit and holdings of two prominent anti-discrimination cases 
brought on behalf of children excluded from public schools as a result of 
asserted disabilities, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania194 and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of 
Columbia,195 also inspired the current federal statutes. Both recognized 
that disabilities impacted non-academic components of education.196 
                                                     
191
 Education for All Handicapped Children, 1973–74: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 
93d Cong. 8-9 (1973).  
192
 Id.  
193
 Id.  
194
 Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 
1972). 
195
 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
196
 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.2 (1982) (recognizing that 
“[t]wo cases, Mills . . . and [PARC] . . . , were . . . identified as the most 
prominent of the cases contributing to Congress’ enactment of the Act”); see 
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Neither PARC nor Mills focused exclusively on disabilities that impacted 
grades. Instead, in Mills in particular, the court considered claims 
brought on behalf of children, including the named plaintiff, whose 
disabilities created a “behavior problem” rather than a “grade problem” 
at school.197 The court held that the Constitution protected the right of 
this behaviorally-impaired plaintiff to educational services in the public 
schools irrespective of his academic performance.198 Reflecting on this 
holding during hearings on the passage of the Education of All 
Handicapped Children Act, Senator Mondale stated that in light of 
“[r]ecent court decisions,” the new legislation would ensure that “each 
handicapped child be treated as an individual with unique strengths and 
weaknesses, and not as a member of a category of children all presumed 
to have the same needs.”199 All children may not experience adverse 
academic impacts requiring academic support; instead, some, like the 
plaintiff in Mills, may experience adverse behavioral impacts requiring 
“behavioral” support. This truth was embraced in the earliest versions of 
the IDEA.200 
 
                                                                                                                      
also WEBER, MAWDSLEY & REDFIELD, supra note 38, at 16 (recognizing that 
“P.A.R.C. and Mills provided the court-made law which became the basis for the 
rights which are now afforded by federal and state statutes to students in need of 
special services”). 
197
 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 869 (stating that plaintiffs and defendants admit that 
the named plaintiff, Peter Mills, for example, was excluded from school in the 
fourth grade because “Peter allegedly was a ‘behavior problem,’” not because 
Peter received poor grades, and holding that “defendants are required by the 
Constitution of the United States . . . to provide a publicly-supported education 
for these ‘exceptional’ children” without examining academic performance and 
that “insufficient funds” does not justify a failure to fulfill this obligation).  
198
 Id. at 875–76. It is worth noting that several of the plaintiffs in Mills had 
been excluded from public school for “behavior” problems that may have been 
manifestations of unaccommodated disabilities as has happened with 
unaccommodated children with Asperger’s Syndrome. See, e.g., Mr. I. ex rel. 
L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 4–6 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(considering the IDEA eligibility of a young girl who was denied IDEA 
eligibility and accommodations because she was excelling academically but 
who was ultimately removed from public schools by her parents after she began 
cutting herself, skipping school, and attempted suicide).  
199
 Education for All Handicapped Children, 1973-74: Hearings on S.6 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 93d Cong. 1153–54 (1973) (statement of Sen. Mondale, Member, S. 
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare). 
200
 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180 (stating that Congress was “spurred by two 
District Court decisions [Mills and PARC] holding that handicapped children 
should be given access to a public education” when it passed the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act and increased federal funding for children with 
disabilities). 
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Not only does this early legislative history support an inclusive 
understanding of disability under the IDEA as a whole and specifically 
within the regulatory requirement that disabilities “adversely affect[] . . . 
educational performance,”201 but recent legislative action also reflects 
Congress’s continuing support for this original understanding. Members 
of Congress have expressed concern that children might be diagnosed 
with disabilities “when, in fact, they do not have such conditions.”202 For 
this reason, Congress has been mindful to craft this legislation carefully 
to prevent non-disabled children from being designated disabled for 
purposes of the Act. In working toward this goal, however, Congress 
specifically declined to accomplish it through a requirement that 
disabling conditions significantly affect academic performance. Instead, 
over time, Congress repeatedly opened wider the door to eligibility 
under the IDEA, inviting in broader groups of children with increasingly 
diverse needs.  
For example, in 1986, Congress opened the door to infants between 
birth and age three with developmental delays even when these infants 
had no history of academic or “grade” failure.203 In 1990, Congress 
specifically invited children with autism and traumatic brain injuries into 
the family of disabilities enumerated by the statute as qualifying for 
services and protection under the Act.204 In so doing, Congress chose not 
to require that children with these disabilities “fail first” in order to be 
recognized as having a qualifying disability. In 1997, Congress further 
opened the door to the services and protections afforded under the IDEA 
to children without any diagnosed disability at all so long as they 
experienced “developmental delays” between the ages of three and 
nine.205 Congress did not require these developmental delays to be 
measured in cognitive development or academic achievement.206 Instead, 
the IDEA expressly provides that these developmental delays might be 
measured in “physical development; . . . communication development; 
social or emotional development; or adaptive development,” in addition 
to or instead of cognitive development.207 In 2004, Congress again 
                                                     
201
 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (2011) (defining IDEA’s eligibility categories to require 
proof that the designated disabilities “adversely affect[] . . . education 
performance” except in the case of specific learning disabilities where this 
requirement is not imposed affirmatively, but may be implied in the diagnosis).  
202
 S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 26–27 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 
1450. 
203
 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1431–35 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
204
 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
205
 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-17, 11 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified in relevant part as amended at 20 
U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B) (2006)).  
206
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B) (2006). 
207
 Id.  
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broadened the ability of state and local governments to support students 
in need of special educational services through the IDEA by permitting 
use of up to 15% of IDEA funding for children in any grade from 
kindergarten through twelfth grade “who have not been identified as 
needing special education or related services [thus not satisfying the 
third prong of the standard IDEA-eligibility test] but who need 
additional academic and behavioral support to succeed in a general 
education environment.”208 Again, when Congress opened up IDEA’s 
resources to children without disabilities, it continued to recognize that 
demonstrated need for both “academic and behavioral support” at any 
level (not only at failure) justify some coverage under the Act.209 By 
repeatedly expanding the ways by which individuals might gain access 
to services and protections under the IDEA, and by consistently 
recognizing that performance can be measured more than just by 
academics at school, the legislative history of the IDEA belies judicial 
interpretations of the Act that limit eligible conditions to those that 
significantly affect grades or test scores. 
The language of the IDEA itself also contradicts judicially-imposed 
eligibility limitations that require children to experience significant 
negative impacts on academic performance (failing grades) prior to 
being recognized as a “child with a disability” under the Act.210 The 
IDEA defines a “child with a disability.” It provides that a child between 
                                                     
208
 Id. § 1413(f)(1) (2006).  
209
 Id. (emphasis added). 
210
 For examples of decisions in which courts have narrowly construed the 
IDEA’s eligibility requirements, see, e.g., J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 
224 F.3d 60, 66–68 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying Vermont’s law to narrowly construe 
the meaning of the eligibility requirements under the IDEA); Maus v. 
Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(applying New York’s law in an Asperger’s Syndrome case to narrowly construe 
the meaning of the eligibility requirements under the IDEA to require that a 
disability have an “adverse impact on academic performance, as opposed to 
social development or integration”) (citing C.B. ex. rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of Educ., 
No. 08-0881, 2009 WL 928093, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2009) and Mr. N.C. v. 
Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 07-1077, 2008 WL 4874535, at *1–2 (2d Cir. 
Nov. 12, 2008)); Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1106–09 
(9th Cir. 2007) (relying on California law to narrowly construe the meaning of 
eligibility requirements under the IDEA to determine that if a child makes 
adequate academic progress in school with services offered outside an 
obligation under the IDEA, that child cannot suggest that he does not make 
academic progress to secure the same protections under the IDEA); A.J. v. Bd. 
of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299, 308–11 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York 
law in an Asperger’s Syndrome case to narrowly construe the meaning of the 
eligibility requirements under the IDEA to require an adverse academic effect 
on school rather than an adverse social or behavioral impact on school 
performance). 
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the ages of three and twenty-one,211 with one of the statutorily 
enumerated disabling conditions,212 who needs special education and 
related services “by reason thereof,”213 is a “child with a disability” 
under the statute. That is it. The IDEA does not require that a child fail a 
course or a grade prior to being recognized as having a disability under 
the IDEA.  
Of course, imposing a one-size-fits-all eligibility test or requiring a 
pre-determined grade-point average or test score as necessary for 
eligibility would simplify the IDEA-eligibility analysis, but Congress 
has never opted for simplicity. Instead, Congress consistently elected 
over time to require consideration of the complexity of unique needs and 
abilities in each individual child to facilitate their “full participation”214 
in school toward the goal of improving not only academic achievement, 
but also the “functional performance of children with disabilities”215 as 
they prepare for a lifetime of “independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency” through school.216  
Congress recognizes what society continues to work to understand: 
“Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way 
diminishes the rights of individuals to participate in or contribute to 
society.”217 Education is “more effective” under the IDEA when we have 
“high expectations”218 across the board and “provid[e] . . . aides and 
supports in the [inclusive] regular classroom . . . whenever appropriate” 
to facilitate children’s progress toward full community integration with 
independence and self-sufficiency, not exclusively when necessary to 
ensure passing grades.219  
Toward this end, eligibility determinations must be made by a team, 
not a test, using a variety of assessment tools and strategies not limited 
to academic assessments.220 The IDEA requires that Individualized 
Education Program Teams conducting evaluations for eligibility under 
the Act “use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather 
relevant functional, developmental, and academic information,” not 
limited to grades or test scores.221 In making eligibility determinations, 
                                                     
211
 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
212
 Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
213
 Id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii) (2006). 
214
 Id. § 1400(c)(1) (2006). 
215
 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(E) (2006).  
216
 Id. § 1400(c)(1) (2006). 
217
 Id. 
218
 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(A) (2006). 
219
 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(D) (2006). 
220
 Id. § 1414(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
221
 Id. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2011); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(a)(1) 
(2011) (providing that “[a] group of qualified professionals and the parent of the 
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the team must “[d]raw upon information from a variety of sources” with 
no particular source given greater weight than any other.222 Recognized 
developmental delays identified through this evaluation process that can 
form the foundation for eligibility include delays in “communication[,] . 
. . social[,] . . . emotional[,] . . . or adaptive development,” not only 
delays in “cognitive development.”223 These statutory requirements raise 
the following rhetorical question: Why did Congress require schools to 
invest in diverse eligibility-assessment tools and to consider a diverse 
range of developmental delays if eligibility is to be established by a 
single measure—academic performance?  
Some courts and critics of the IDEA’s inclusive understanding of 
disability point to the special education regulation stating that a child 
who has a recognized disability under the Act – autism, mental 
retardation, a hearing impairment, a speech or language impairment, a 
visual impairment, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic 
impairment, traumatic brain injury, other health impairment, specific 
learning disability, deaf-blindness, or multiple disabilities224 – “but only 
needs a related service and not special education” is “not a child with a 
disability” for purposes of the IDEA.225 These critics conclude that this 
regulation means that a child with a disability who experiences adverse 
communication, social or behavioral consequences of the disability at 
school, but who receives passing academic marks, does not need special 
education, but only related services, and is not therefore a “child with a 
disability.”  
This conclusion in this context (in determining whether a child will 
be recognized as having a disabling condition) has two flaws. First, 
when courts determine that a child does not fall within one of the 
statutorily enumerated disabling conditions for lack of academic failure 
under the regulatory requirement that disabilities “adversely affect . . . 
educational performance,”226 they resolve the second eligibility 
requirement under the IDEA – having a disabling condition – against the 
child. Analysis of this second element does not involve consideration of 
whether a child “by reason [of the disabling condition] needs special 
                                                                                                                      
child determines whether the child is a child with a disability” for purposes of 
eligibility under the Act); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(a) (2011) (establishing the 
required members of the “IEP Team” for each child with a disability, including 
the parents of the child, a regular education teacher (if the child might 
participate in a regular education classroom), a special education provider, and a 
school system representative). 
222
 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(c) (2011). 
223
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2006) (describing areas in which the IDEA covers 
developmental delays in children between the ages of three and nine). 
224
 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1) (2011). 
225
 Id. § 300.8(a)(2)(i) (2011). 
226
 Id. § 300.8(c) (2011).  
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education and related services.”227 That is the precise question presented 
under the third eligibility requirement. In superimposing this “needs 
special education” requirement upon the definitions of disabling 
conditions, courts and critics render meaningless any independent 
requirement that the child have a disabling condition.228  
Second, it does not follow from the regulation providing that a child 
must “need special education” in order to enjoy eligibility under the 
IDEA (as is also required under the third element of the statutory 
eligibility analysis) that only a single type of instruction – academic 
instruction to prevent academic failure – counts as “special education.” A 
conclusion of this sort is inconsistent with the IDEA’s definition of 
“special education” and “related services.” The IDEA defines “special 
education” to include any “specially designed instruction . . . to meet the 
unique needs of a child with a disability,” whether those needs are 
academic or otherwise.229 The Act further provides that this specially-
designed instruction may be provided “in the classroom, in the home, in 
hospitals and institutions and in other settings” and may include 
“instruction in physical education.”230 Nothing in this definition suggests 
that only services necessary to produce good grades in school count as 
“special education.” Instead, recognition that special education is any 
instruction designed to meet the “unique needs of the child with a 
disability” means that when the child’s disability creates a “unique need” 
in communication, social integration, or behavior management, 
instruction designed to meet those needs falls squarely within the 
definition of special education under the Act.  
This understanding of special education is consistent with the Act’s 
definition of “related services.” Related services are defined as a 
complement to special education. More specifically they include 
“transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a 
disability to benefit from special education.”231 Examples of such 
services can include: 
speech-language pathology services and audiology 
services, interpreting services, psychological services, 
                                                     
227
 Id. § 300.8(a)(1) (2011). 
228
 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (2011); see also Hensel, supra note 40, at 1197 
(concluding that while it would be a positive future should disability labels and 
classifications become unnecessary as schools understand and automatically 
serve a continuum of needs and abilities without federal mandates, schools do 
not do this now, and “[t]o create a world where disability does not matter, 
educators and policy makers must begin with the recognition that it does”). 
229
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2006) (emphasis added). 
230
 Id. 
231
 Id. § 1401(26)(A) (2006). 
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physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including 
therapeutic recreation, social work services, school 
nurse services designed to enable a child with a 
disability to receive a free appropriate education as 
described in the individualized education program of the 
child, counseling services, including rehabilitation 
counseling, orientation and mobility services, and 
medical services.232 
Significantly, these are only examples, and they become “related 
services” under the act when they “assist a child . . . to benefit from 
special education.”233 On the other hand, when they are part of the 
“specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a child 
with a disability” in the first instance, they are within the definition of 
“special education,” not “related services,” even if they might also 
qualify as a related service under other circumstances.234 On this point, 
the regulations are clear.  
Eliminating any implication that non-academic instruction might 
automatically be characterized as exclusively “related services,” the 
regulations clarify that “special education” and “related services” are not 
mutually exclusive. They state that special education includes “any . . . 
related service, if the service is considered special education rather than 
a related service under State standards.”235 If the service is “specially 
designed . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability” it is 
“special education,” whether or not it may also be a “related service.”236 
The regulations offer a concrete example of this duality. “Speech-
language pathology services” are listed as an example of a “related 
service” in the definition of that term.237 However, the regulations also 
specifically state: “Special education includes . . . [s]peech-language 
pathology services” under some circumstances.238 More generally, again, 
the regulations provide that “[s]pecial education includes . . . any other 
related service, if the service is considered special education rather than 
a related service under State standards.”239  
                                                     
232
 Id.  
233
 See id. § 1401(26)(A) (2006). 
234
 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(2)(i) (2011) (recognizing that special education 
includes “related service[s], if the service is considered special education rather 
than a related service”).  
235
 Id. § 300.39(2)(i) (2011). 
236
 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(2)(i) (2011). 
237
 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2006).  
238
 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(2)(i) (2011). 
239
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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For purposes of this Article’s consideration of Asperger’s Syndrome, 
“directly teaching social skills and pragmatic language . . . amounts to 
[special education] adapting the content of the usual instruction to 
address the unique needs of [the child with Asperger’s Syndrome].”240 
Teaching social skills and pragmatic language to an autistic child is 
teaching precisely to one of the areas in which the child experiences the 
impact of her disability most significantly.241 This special instruction is 
necessary to ensure the child’s ability to make meaningful progress in 
“educational performance [including] ‘communication’ and . . . career 
preparation.”242 Teaching “social skills and pragmatic language” is not a 
“related service” in educating most children on the autism spectrum. 
Looking closely at the IDEA’s definitions of “special education” and 
“related services,” therefore, confirms that the regulation limiting 
eligibility to those students who require “special education” and not 
merely “related services,” does not support a conclusion that children are 
required to fail on academic measures prior to being recognized as 
having a disabling condition under the Act. Looking further at the type 
of services required by the IDEA for children post-eligibility affirms that 
the IDEA contemplates initial eligibility of students who require more 
than academic support in order to make meaningful progress.243 The 
IDEA requires post-eligibility support specifically for “nonacademic and 
extracurricular services and activities” as well as “physical education”– 
areas of plainly “nonacademic” educational performance.244 The 
regulations also make clear that states must provide a free appropriate 
education to a child with disabilities who needs special education “even 
though the child has not failed or been retained in a course or grade, and 
is advancing from grade to grade.”245 
Taken together, the legislative history underlying the original 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Congressional action 
expanding eligibility over time under the IDEA, the plain language of 
the IDEA’s definition of a “child with a disability,” and the post-
eligibility recognition that special education requires support of children 
who have “not failed” and who “advanc[e] from grade to grade” all 
support a conclusion that the “adversely affect[] . . . educational 
performance” requirement attached to many of the disabling conditions 
under the Act is not synonymous with negative effects on academic 
performance.  
                                                     
240
 Mr. I ex rel. L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 20–21 (1st Cir. 
2007). 
241
 See supra notes 143-70. 
242
 Mr. I, 480 F.3d at 20–21.  
243
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
244
 34 C.F.R. § 300.107 (2011); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29)(B) (2006) 
(defining special education to include “instruction in physical education”).  
245
 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(c)(1) (2011). 
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B. THE POLICY IN THE IDEA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT 
Like the legislative history and the text of the IDEA, Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Act recognize that children may have disabling 
conditions under the Act even if they receive passing test scores and 
passing grades at school. Nevertheless, some lower courts have relied on 
the Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Rowley246 to conclude 
otherwise.247 Reliance upon Rowley in the eligibility context is 
misplaced because Rowley did not raise or address a question of 
eligibility. It instead resolved the meaning of “appropriate education” for 
a child who indisputably satisfied the eligibility requirements under the 
IDEA.248 However, even when one takes the Rowley decision out of 
context and applies it to understandings of the IDEA’s eligibility 
requirements, it fails to support a conclusion that children must fail first 
before becoming eligible for special education under the Act.  
Rowley established, in the context of an IDEA-eligible child with a 
hearing impairment, that schools are not required to “furnish[] . . . every 
special service” available to “maximize [the] . . . child’s potential.”249 
Instead, the IDEA requires schools to provide a “basic floor of 
opportunity” consisting of “personalized instruction with sufficient 
support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that 
instruction.”250 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court 
recognized that neither specific disabling conditions nor eligibility at 
large are limited to those children who do poorly on academic measures. 
From the outset, the Court accepted as a “child with a disability” who 
“needs special education and related services” a plaintiff who “performs 
better than the average child in her class and is advancing easily from 
grade to grade.”251 In fact, the IDEA-eligible child in Rowley was also “a 
remarkably well-adjusted child” who “interact[ed] well with her 
classmates” and “developed an extraordinary rapport with her 
                                                     
246
 458 U.S. 176 (1982).  
247
 See, e.g., Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D., 503 F.3d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(relying on Rowley to conclude that grades ranging from an A to a D 
disqualified a child with a recognized disability who had previously been served 
under the IDEA and who currently suffered admitted behavioral and emotional 
challenges in school from eligibility under the IDEA, but doing so under the 
“needs” element of the eligibility analysis rather than under the “has-a-
disabling-condition” element); Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 
1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on Rowley to bolster a conclusion that state 
laws restrict eligibility under the IDEA to situations in which the child with a 
disability cannot make academic progress with supports offered outside the 
IDEA). 
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 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. 
249
 Id. at 199. 
250
 Id. at 201, 203. 
251
 Id. at 185.  
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teachers.”252 In other words, the Court accepted that the plaintiff had a 
disabling condition and “need[ed] special education and related 
services” despite the fact that she outperformed her classmates 
academically, advanced “easily from grade to grade,” and otherwise 
thrived in the academic environment at school.253 This supports a 
conclusion that academic failure is not a prerequisite to eligibility under 
either the second (having-a-disabling-condition) or third (needing-
special-education-and-related-services) elements of the eligibility 
analysis. 
Additionally, the Rowley Court specifically stated, “We do not hold 
today that every handicapped child who is advancing from grade to 
grade in a regular public school system is automatically receiving a ‘free 
appropriate education.’”254 Instead, the Court concluded that “grading 
and advancement” constitute one “factor in determining educational 
benefit.”255 Through this recognition that grade advancement does not 
equal “appropriate education,” the Court implicitly acknowledged that 
successful academic performance is not the only measure of educational 
performance at school. In other words, a child advancing from grade to 
grade due to strong academic performance may not be advancing in 
other areas of educational performance, making the child’s education 
insufficient overall.  
This understanding of the IDEA’s broad inclusion of children with a 
variety of educational needs is supported by other Supreme Court 
decisions as well. While the Court has never interpreted the regulatory 
“adversely affects . . . educational performance” standard under the Act, 
it has considered other statutory provisions in a manner that sheds 
relevant light on the overall legislation. For example, in Honig v. Doe, 
the Court held that schools must provide social and behavioral support to 
children with emotional impairments to allow them to benefit from 
regular educational instruction, even when the behavioral and social 
challenges posed by their disabilities create a potential safety risk.256 
Similarly, in Cedar Rapids v. Community School District v. Garret F., the 
Court held that a school must provide practical support in the form of 
“continuous one-on-one nursing service” to support a child’s “ventilator 
dependency” such that he could remain in school during the school 
day.257  
These Supreme Court decisions recognize that the “Act requires 
participating States to educate a wide spectrum of handicapped children, 
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 Id.  
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 Id.  
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 Id. at 203 n.25.  
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 Id. at 203. 
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 484 U.S. 305, 307 (1988).  
257
 526 U.S. 66, 67, 70, 76 (1999).  
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from the marginally hearing-impaired to the profoundly retarded and 
palsied.”258 Similarly, they recognize that different children require 
different services in order to access the education provided in the public 
schools. “One child may have little difficulty competing successfully in 
the academic setting with non-handicapped children while another child 
may encounter great difficulty in acquiring even the most basic of self-
maintenance skills.”259 While some children with disabilities may 
experience academic failure and require academic support services 
through the IDEA, other children with disabilities, like the plaintiffs in 
Honig and A.J. in the introductory case, may receive fine academic 
assessments but experience setbacks in behavioral and social 
performance at school requiring support services in those areas. Other 
children with disabilities, like the plaintiff in Cedar Rapids Community 
School, may also enjoy fine cognitive capacities, but yet require 
extensive practical support services in order to remain in school.  
Any interpretation of the disabling conditions under the IDEA to 
exclude children unless and until they first fail academically flies in the 
face of this inclusive understanding of disability reflected in the Act and 
in the Supreme Court decisions interpreting it. Congress intended and 
the Court has recognized “that handicapped children [should] be enabled 
to achieve a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency . . . to become 
productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to 
remain burdens.”260 “[P]roviding appropriate educational services now 
[while children remain children] means that many of these individuals 
will be able to become a contributing part of our society, and they will 
not have to depend on subsistence payments from public funds.”261  
To become independent and self-sufficient members of society, 
children with disabilities must often master skills that other children 
without their disabilities learn in their homes with the support of their 
families and without formal education at school. For example, some 
children with significant impairments, in order to become independent 
and self-sufficient members of society, must work hard to master basic 
living skills including toileting, dressing, and feeding themselves.262 
Most children without significant disabilities develop these skills in their 
homes. For children with significant impairments, however, instruction 
                                                     
258
 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.  
259
 Id. 
260
 Id. at 201 n.23 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
261
 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
262
 See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 
1988) (recognizing that provision of a free appropriate public education to a 
child who contracted encephalopathy as a child and who had at fourteen years 
of age “the functional and mental capacity of a toddler” requires special 
education consisting of “learning basic life skills such as feeding himself, 
dressing himself, and using the toilet”). 
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and support in learning these skills must become part of their special 
educational program.263 No one suggests that these children, with 
educational needs of this sort, are not entitled to this special educational 
instruction under the IDEA.264  
Likewise, children without significant cognitive deficits but with 
other disabilities (like children with Asperger’s Syndrome) in order to 
become independent, self-sufficient, and employable members of 
society, must work hard to master social living and pragmatic 
communication skills, such as making eye contact with others, engaging 
in reciprocal conversation, tolerating group interaction and touch, 
interpreting nonverbal communication cues, or avoiding verbal 
outbursts.265 Most children without disabilities develop these skills in 
their homes with the support of their families and without formal 
education. For children with Asperger’s Syndrome, however, instruction 
and support in learning these skills must become part of a special 
education program.266 The IDEA includes these children with disabilities 
just as much as it includes children with impairments impacting their 
abilities to master other basic living skills regardless of whether they 
have satisfactory academic performance.267 By doing so, the IDEA 
increases the likelihood that children with Asperger’s Syndrome “will be 
able to become a contributing part of our society, and . . . will not have to 
depend on subsistence payments from public funds.”268 
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 Id. at 173 (recognizing that provision of a free appropriate public education 
to a child who contracted encephalopathy as a child and who had at fourteen 
years of age “the functional and mental capacity of a toddler” requires special 
education consisting of “learning basic life skills such as feeding himself, 
dressing himself, and using the toilet”). 
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 Id.  
265
 See supra notes 153-57 (discussing the case of Cathleen Comber, an adult 
with high-functioning autism, and the employment consequences she faced 
when confronted by an employer who refused to accommodate a symptom of 
her autism resulting in a verbal outburst (also a symptom of autism arising out 
of communication and social perceptive challenges associated with the 
disability) leading to her termination).  
266
 See supra notes 3–24 (discussing the case of A.J., a child with Asperger’s 
Syndrome who performed well as a kindergartener on academic tasks, but who 
experienced significant social and behavioral performance deficits in the 
classroom when compared to his non-disabled peers).  
267
 OSEP Letter to Anonymous, 110 LRP 52277 (January 13, 2010) (recognizing 
that the IDEA entitles a child with “high-cognition” and with Asperger’s 
Syndrome to “special education and related services” to address his needs in 
“the affective areas, [including] social skills and classroom behavior, as 
appropriate”).  
268
 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 n.23 (1982); see also supra notes 
153–57 (highlighting the case of an adult with high-functioning autism who lost 
her job at least in part because she did not have effective pre-employment 
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C. OSEP INTERPRETATIONS OF THE IDEA 
The United States Department of Education, Office of Special 
Education Programs (OSEP), administers the IDEA and provides 
guidance on issues of special education to state and local 
governments.269 As part of this responsibility, it answers questions from 
state and local governmental officials who have concerns about the 
IDEA. Although OSEP’s opinion letters amount to informal guidance 
and are not legally binding, they represent the position of the United 
States Department of Education on the meaning of the legislation it 
administers.  
Over the course of three decades, OSEP has repeatedly and 
consistently interpreted the phrase “adversely affect[] . . . educational 
performance” in the regulations defining autism and other disabling 
conditions with an inclusive understanding of disability.270 Specifically, 
in letters from 1980 through 2010, OSEP has confirmed that children 
may be children “with” specified disabling conditions without first 
failing in academic performance.271 OSEP has made clear its position 
that “[t]he [eligibility] assessment is more than the measurement of the 
child’s academic performance as determined by standardized 
measures.”272 
In 1980, in response to a request for clarification of the “adversely 
affects . . . educational performance” provision within the regulatory 
definition of a speech impairment, OSEP “stated that academic 
achievement was not the sole benchmark of an adverse affect on 
educational performance.”273 OSEP opined that “experts should 
determine whether a speech impairment” has adverse effects on 
educational performance in each particular case under all the 
circumstances.274  
                                                                                                                      
training in non-academic performance areas impacted by her autism, including 
effective pragmatic communication, social skills, and behavior skills). 
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 OSEP Mission Statement, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ 
osers/osep/mission.html (last updated July 8, 2004).  
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 See, e.g., OSEP Letter to Lillie/Felton, 23 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUC. L. REP. 714 (April 5, 1995); OSEP Letter to Pawlisch, 24 INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 959 (March 6, 1996); OSEP Letter to Clarke, 
48 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. (March 8, 2007); OSEP 
Letter to Anonymous, supra note 267 (also considering gifted children with a 
handful of other disabilities, notably ADHD and specific learning disabilities).  
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 See supra note 260. 
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 OSEP Letter to Pawlisch, supra note 270. 
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 Mary P. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. 1173, 1176 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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In 1995, OSEP reiterated that students who make progress in the 
regular educational environment, including students with physical 
impairments who perform well in school, may require special 
educational services. OSEP explained that the phrase “adversely affects . 
. . educational performance” is not subject to precise definition.275 This 
phrase, according to OSEP, must instead be established on a case-by-
case basis taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances in 
each instance.276  
In 2007, OSEP responded to a “request [for] guidance and/or 
clarification” about whether “the policy on . . . ‘adversely affects 
educational performance’ as described in [the 1980 OSEP letter] remains 
the policy of the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special 
Education Programs.”277 OSEP responded, “It remains the Department’s 
position that the term ‘educational performance’ as used in the IDEA and 
its implementing regulations is not limited to academic performance.”278 
Further, OSEP reemphasized that “whether a[n] . . . impairment 
adversely affects a child’s educational performance must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, depending on the unique needs of a particular 
child and not based only on discrepancies in age or grade performance in 
academic subject areas.”279 OSEP also reiterated that eligibility 
determinations require consideration of a “variety of assessment tools 
and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and 
academic information . . . [and are] not limited to information about the 
child’s academic performance.”280 
Most recently in 2010, OSEP addressed specifically whether 
children with Asperger’s Syndrome and high cognitive function or 
“giftedness” are eligible for special educational services under the IDEA 
when they “struggle to timely complete grade-level work and have 
difficulties with organizational skills, homework completion, affective 
areas, social skills, classroom behavior, reading and math fluency, [or] 
writing and math operations” but otherwise do well academically.281 
OSEP responded with unwavering clarity and consistency: “It remains 
the Department’s position that students who have high cognition, have 
disabilities[,] and require special education and related services are 
protected under the IDEA and its implementing regulations.”282 OSEP 
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explained that “a child with high cognition and . . . with Asperger’s 
Syndrome could be addressed under the disability category of autism[,] 
and the individualized evaluation would address the special education 
and related services needs in the affective areas, social skills and 
classroom behavior, as appropriate,” rather than in academic 
performance.283 Ultimately, this 2010 OSEP letter concluded in now-
familiar terms: “the IDEA and its regulations do provide protections for 
students with high cognition and disabilities who require special 
education and related services to address their individual needs.”284  
In the end, taking together the IDEA’s legislative history, the terms 
of the IDEA itself, Supreme Court interpretations of the Act, and OSEP’s 
guidance, there can be little doubt that judicial interpretations of 
“adversely affects . . . educational performance” limiting disabling 
conditions to those that result in failing academic performance are 
contrary to the IDEA’s mandate throughout its thirty-five year history.  
IV. FACING THE JUDICIALLY-IMPOSED ACADEMIC “FAILURE FIRST” 
REQUIREMENT: CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
VULNERABILITY IT CREATES. 
When federal courts define the regulatory phrase “adversely affects 
educational performance” narrowly, they not only create inconsistencies 
with the IDEA’s statutory mandate, they also raise constitutional 
concerns. While it is unlikely that equal protection claims like those 
originally raised in Mills285 and PARC286 might be revitalized by children 
with disabilities who are once again excluded from appropriate 
educational services through narrow constructions of the statute, a new 
constitutional concern arises out of courts’ reliance on state law to 
interpret the federal statute. When state law definitions of the IDEA’s 
terms exclude children with disabilities who would otherwise be covered 
by the Act, those state law definitions must be preempted by the IDEA 
under the Supremacy Clause.287  
When federal courts turn to state laws to define the federal 
regulatory phrase “adversely affects . . . educational performance,” they 
raise a Supremacy Clause concern. The Supremacy Clause in Article VI 
of the Constitution provides that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the 
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284
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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 Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 
1972). 
287
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United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”288 Pursuant to this 
language, “[s]tate law provisions that restrict entitlements established by 
federal statutes are void under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.”289 
In the IDEA context, some scholars have advocated in favor of 
turning to state law to give meaning to the “adversely affects . . . 
educational performance” requirement despite this federal preemption 
concern. These scholars argue that states and localities are “recognized 
experts in education” who have authority to make decisions about 
educational programming for purposes of the IDEA’s “free appropriate 
public education” standard.290 As a result they argue that states are best 
suited to fill in gaps throughout the IDEA, including in the eligibility 
provisions.291 Some courts follow this reasoning and rely on state law to 
interpret the “adversely affects educational performance” standard in the 
IDEA.  
Other scholars assert that reliance on state law in the eligibility 
context, as opposed to the determining-free-appropriate-public-
education-standards context, is inappropriate. These scholars make the 
case that states cannot determine “who is to be served under a federally[-
]funded program designed to address the national problem of children 
with disabilities who are out of school or in inappropriate programs.”292 
This determination, they argue, was made by Congress in the IDEA.  
This Article does not take a position on the question of whether it is 
ever appropriate to turn to state law to illuminate the meaning of the 
IDEA’s undefined eligibility requirements – like the “adversely affects 
educational performance” requirement in the regulatory definitions of 
some disabilities.293 Such a position is unnecessary for purposes of this 
Article. Any comprehensive assessment of states’ expectations about 
student performance at school must recognize that all states impose 
behavioral, social, communication, and sensory expectations on students, 
in addition to academic performance expectations, through statutes or 
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policies.294 While many states do not require teachers to spend time 
affirmatively teaching each of these performance expectations as part of 
the academic curriculum, they exist “on the books” so to speak, and 
students must satisfy them or receive negative consequences in the form 
of school discipline or bad grades or otherwise, depending upon the 
circumstances. Thus, students whose disabilities adversely impact their 
ability to satisfy expectations in any performance area, even if their 
disability does not adversely impact their ability to perform in all of 
them, are children with disabilities who require special education in the 
impacted area(s). If state laws are considered in this manner, they are 
consistent with the IDEA’s terms, history, and expressed purpose.295 As 
such, this broad view of state law for purposes of understanding 
“adversely affects educational performance” in the IDEA’s disability 
definitions would not conflict with the federal law or raise a Supremacy 
Clause concern. 
This Article does take a position on the question of whether courts 
may constitutionally consider select provisions in state special education 
law or policy rather than the totality of state public school law or policy 
to interpret federal IDEA eligibility provisions narrowly, limiting access 
to the IDEA exclusively to students whose disabilities result in academic 
failure.296 A narrow look at state law in this manner is impermissible and 
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 Each state has adopted policies or statutes establishing behavioral 
performance expectations by requiring, for example, that students avoid getting 
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(applying New York’s law in an Asperger’s Syndrome case to narrowly construe 
the meaning of the eligibility requirements under the IDEA to require that a 
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does raise a Supremacy Clause concern. In other words, even if it is 
permissible for courts to rely on state law to understand undefined 
IDEA-eligibility terms in some situations, a limited look at less than the 
totality of a state’s public school laws to limit eligibility violates the 
Supremacy Clause when doing so produces an outcome in conflict with 
federal law.297  
As the Supreme Court has recognized: “[U]nder the Supremacy 
Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, 
however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes 
with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”298 The difficulty in pre-
emption law is, of course, determining whether a particular state or local 
law “interferes with or is contrary to” a federal law on the same question. 
The Supreme Court has recognized a variety of circumstances in which 
state or local laws interfere with or are contrary to federal law for 
purposes of pre-emption doctrine. Of the multiple means by which a 
state or local law may be pre-empted by federal law, the most relevant in 
this context is “implied conflict pre-emption.” 
Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and is 
compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly 
stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in 
its structure and purpose. Absent explicitly pre-emptive 
language, we have recognized at least two types of 
implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the 
                                                                                                                      
disability have an “adverse impact on academic performance as opposed to 
social development or integration”) (citing In re C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of 
Educ., No. 08-0881, 2009 WL 928093, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2009) and Mr. N.C. 
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Nov. 12, 2008)); Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 
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secure the same protections under the IDEA); A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 
2d 299, 302 (E.D.N.Y 2010) (applying New York law in an Asperger’s 
Syndrome case to narrowly construe the meaning of the eligibility requirements 
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performance rather than an adverse social or behavioral impact on school 
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Security Act’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program] and for that 
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 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for 
the States to supplement it, and conflict pre-emption, 
where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.299 
While multiple means exist through which a state or local law may 
be pre-empted by a federal law, the Court has emphasized in each of 
these contexts that “[t]he exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to 
be presumed.”300 In fact, any pre-emption analysis must “start with the 
assumption that the historic powers of the States [are] not to be 
superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”301 Nonetheless, “the current Supreme Court, with 
its commitment to federalism and protecting states’ rights, has been quite 
willing to find preemption.”302 In fact, “[e]ven if Congress has not 
expressly preempted state law, and even if federal law does not occupy 
the field and there is no conflict between the federal and state laws, 
preemption still can be found if a court concludes that the state law 
interferes with a federal goal.”303 
This occurs when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”304 This can happen readily – and has happened – in instances 
                                                     
299
 Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
300
 N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) 
(citations and quotations omitted).  
301
 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
302
 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 405 
(4th ed. 2011); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) 
(finding federal law to preempt state law); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363 (2000); Grier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). But 
see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I 
cannot join the majority's implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied pre-
emption doctrines. . . . I have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s 
‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence. Under this approach, the 
Court routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad 
federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of 
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law . . . . 
[I]mplied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are 
inconsistent with the Constitution.”).  
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 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 302, at 423. 
304
 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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in which federal legislation creates a system of cooperative 
federalism.305 
“IDEA is frequently described as a model of cooperative 
federalism.”306 Cooperative federalism is “a system in which . . . divided 
authority is brought together . . . [to] enable[] the cooperating 
governments to benefit from one another’s special capacities while still 
preserving the value of political pluralism.”307 Through cooperative 
federalism, a national program is “financed largely by the Federal 
Government . . . and is administered by the States. States are not 
required to participate . . . but those which desire to take advantage of 
the substantial federal funds available for distribution . . . are required to 
submit” to the federal law.308  
In the specific context of the IDEA, “the Act leaves to the States the 
primary responsibility for developing and executing educational 
programs for handicapped children, [but] it imposes significant 
requirements to be followed in the discharge of that responsibility.”309 
Compliance by the states with the federal requirements “is assured by 
provisions permitting the withholding of federal funds upon 
determination that a participating state or local agency has failed to 
satisfy the requirements of the Act . . . and by the provision for judicial 
review.”310 When states enforce state laws, regulations, or policies in 
conflict with provisions or the purpose of the controlling federal 
legislation, the state laws are invalid.311 
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 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (finding state law 
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 King, 392 U.S. at 316. 
309
 Bd. of Educ v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).  
310
 Id.  
311
 See, e.g., King, 392 U.S. at 333 (holding that a state regulation was “invalid 
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provision in the federal Social Security Act]”); Nash v. Fl. Indus. Comm’n, 389 
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Relations Board was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because 
the state law imposed a punishment for doing something the Court inferred was 
a key purpose of the Act).  
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In both King v. Smith312 and Rosado v. Wyman,313 the Supreme Court 
held that state-law definitions of undefined federal terms in a federal 
statute through which federal and state governments shared a 
cooperative federalism relationship were unconstitutional because those 
state-law definitions “impermissibly lowered” the benefit federal law 
intended to provide. Both King and Rosado arose in the context of states’ 
provision of welfare benefits pursuant to the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children provisions of the Social Security Act.  
In King, the Court considered a state’s definition of the word 
“parent,” an undefined word within the federal definition of “dependent 
child” in the Social Security Act. The state law included a “substitute 
father,” any able-bodied man who “cohabits” with a natural or adoptive 
mother of the dependent child at any place, either in the child’s home 
permanently or as an occasional visitor or outside the child’s home, 
within its definition of “parent” for purposes of administering the federal 
law.314 Under the state law, “substitute fathers” were considered 
“parents” even if they had no legal obligation to support the children at 
issue and did not in fact support the children at issue.315 A family who 
would have qualified for benefits under the federal program but for the 
state’s definition of “parent” (as the mother was cohabiting with a man 
who had no financial obligation to her children and who was not offering 
any financial support) challenged the constitutionality of the state 
definition precluding them from benefits.316 
In considering this challenge, the Court first interpreted the word 
“parent” in the federal law independently of the state law and concluded 
that under the federal law the word “parent” included only individuals 
with a legal obligation to support the dependent child.317 The Court then 
considered the effect of the state law on this interpretation of the federal 
law and recognized that the state-law definition of “parent” significantly 
restricted the reach and benefit of the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program under the Social Security Act.318 As a result, the state-
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Families with Dependent Children program established under the Social 
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Court’s interpretation of the otherwise undefined federal provisions. “The 
impact of the new system [under state law] has been to reduce substantially 
benefits paid to families of these petitioners and of those similarly situated . . . .” 
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law definition was preempted by the federal law under the Supremacy 
Clause.  
In both King and Rosado, the Court emphasized that “[t]here is no 
question that [s]tates have considerable latitude”319 and “a great deal of 
discretion”320 with respect to welfare standards within their borders. 
Likewise, the Court acknowledged that matters of morality and family, 
like the ones at issue in King, typically are within states’ “general 
power.”321 As such, the Court did “not . . . question . . . [states’] general 
power to deal with conduct it regards as immoral and with the problem 
of illegitimacy.”322  
However, despite states’ general authority over issues of morality 
and family within their borders, and despite their general discretion to set 
standards for welfare benefits, a restrictive state-law definition of an 
undefined federal term effectively limiting access to a federal benefit 
was constitutionally impermissible. The Court emphasized that through 
passage of the Act “Congress [] determined that immorality and 
illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather 
than measures that punish dependent children [when] protection of such 
children is the paramount goal of [the Aid for Families with Dependent 
Children program].”323 The Court then determined from the “pattern of 
[the] legislation” that its goal was “clear[].”324 The state law definition of 
“parent” to include “substitute fathers” who had no legal obligation to 
support dependent children was inconsistent with that goal and deprived 
needy children of support to which they were entitled under the federal 
law and was “therefore invalid.”325 
The facts of King and Rosado parallel the facts presented in this 
Article’s introductory example case and subsequent analysis. Just as the 
restrictive state law definition of “parent” in King disqualified needy 
children who were otherwise within the scope of the federal law’s reach, 
the restrictive state law definitions of “educational performance” at issue 
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in IDEA-eligibility cases disqualify children with disabilities who would 
otherwise be within the scope of the IDEA’s protections. 
While it is true that education is typically within the province of 
state law,326 the same can be said of morality and family, which were at 
issue in King. The Court in King held that states’ “general power” and 
“discretion” to govern in a particular area do not preclude Congress from 
limiting states’ ability to do so when they accept federal funds to 
administer a federal program, like the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program or, in the case under consideration here, the IDEA’s 
special education program. Thus, the fact that states have “general 
power” and “discretion” over education does not prevent a conclusion 
that state-law definitions of “educational performance” limiting the reach 
of the IDEA are in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.  
“When (federal) money is spent to promote the general welfare, the 
concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the 
states.”327 Likewise, when federal money is spent to promote 
improvement of educational results for “children with disabilities,” the 
concept of “children with disabilities” is shaped by Congress, not the 
states. Thus, under the IDEA, just as under the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program, when states attempt to shape this benefit 
in a manner that diminishes or conflicts with the Congressional purpose, 
the state attempt is invalid.328 More specifically for purposes of this 
Article, when state laws define “adversely affects educational 
performance” to require significant effects on academic performance 
amounting to failure, the state laws impermissibly deny the benefits of 
the IDEA to some children with disabilities who would otherwise enjoy 
the benefits of the Act, like A.J. and many other children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome.  
While children with Asperger’s Syndrome often experience the 
negative effects of their disabilities at school,329 restrictive state laws 
have impermissibly denied them benefits otherwise afforded to them by 
Congress under the IDEA.330 Thus, under the analysis in King and 
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Rosado, these restrictive interpretations of “adversely affects educational 
performance” ought be constitutionally preempted by the IDEA under 
the Supremacy Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion is clear: The IDEA envisions, and the Constitution 
and public policy support, an open-door approach to disability 
designation for purposes of eligibility under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act. In fact, the IDEA and its regulations, when 
properly understood, require educators and courts to enforce the Act on 
behalf of all school-age children who need special educational services 
in any performance area, even when some of those children earn passing 
grades in class. The IDEA’s optimistic goal to improve “educational 
results for children with disabilities” as a matter of “equality of 
opportunity” is advanced only when this mandate is embraced in full.  
Narrow interpretations of the IDEA’s eligibility provisions that 
require children with recognized disabilities to “fail first” academically 
in order to be included as disabled for purposes of the Act dilute the 
Act’s power to promote its goal of ensuring all children with disabilities 
an equal opportunity for success in school. They also place at risk the 
long-term achievement of those children with disabilities who, at least 
temporarily, earn passing grades. More specifically, when courts 
narrowly construe the IDEA’s eligibility requirements to close the door 
on children like A.J. and others with Asperger’s Syndrome whose 
disabilities place them close to the perceived border between general and 
special education, they create an illusory crater between “regular” and 
“special” education students. This illusory crater risks entrenching the 
concept of the disabled as “other,” enhancing the stigma associated with 
disability, and ultimately making it less likely that any children with 
                                                                                                                      
688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York’s law in an 
Asperger’s Syndrome case to narrowly construe the meaning of the eligibility 
requirements under the IDEA to require that a disability have an “adverse 
impact on academic performance, as opposed to social development or 
integration”) (citing In re C.B. ex. rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-0881, 
2009 WL 928093, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2009) and Mr. N.C. v. Bedford Cent. 
Sch. Dist., No. 07-1077, 2008 WL 4874535, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2008)); 
Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1106–09 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(relying on California law to narrowly construe the meaning of eligibility 
requirements under the IDEA to determine that if a child makes adequate 
academic progress in school with services offered outside an obligation under 
the IDEA, that child cannot suggest that he does not make academic progress to 
secure the same protections under the IDEA); A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 
2d 299, 308–11 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New York law in an Asperger’s 
Syndrome case to narrowly construe the meaning of the eligibility requirements 
under the IDEA to require an adverse academic effect on school rather than an 
adverse social or behavioral impact on school performance). 
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disabilities will find themselves fully integrated into society and able to 
engage in meaningful work toward our collective good.  
To prevent this future of failure, courts need only embrace the IDEA 
as it is written and enforce its inclusive understanding of disability. With 
consistent enforcement in this manner over time, educators and school 
children may come to embrace the natural continuum of human ability 
and grow to consider it in the ordinary course of planning and 
experiencing life. When this happens, Americans will have taken a 
significant step forward toward fulfillment of our national policy of 
ensuring “equality of opportunity” for all children, including those with 
a range of differing abilities.  
